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1. INTRODUCTION 
To consider the introduction of nuclear energy in arid areas 
such as Saudi Arabia, requires an assessment of the potential of 
nuclear energy to produce water by desalination and electrical power. 
Generation of electricity by nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia 
would not be different from current commercial nuclear activities 
in the U.S. and other countries. However, production of fresh 
water from the sea using nuclear energy has not reached the commer­
cial stage yet, although the technology has been developed. 
Construction of nucleaur power plants in Saudi Arabia requires 
the consideration of several points. Including « 
1. Availability of skilled manpower for construction, management, 
aoid operation of the plants, 
2. Site selection, 
3. Competitiveness of imported nuclear fuel use with locally 
availaUble fossil fuels, 
4. Availability of support industries, 
5. Availability of required coolants, 
6. Selection of compatible types of reactors or fuel cycles, and 
7. Selection of appropriate plant sizes, depending on the na­
tional plan of whether to have a national electric grid or 
to concentrate on supplying a localized community demand. 
Since the electric power demand in Saudi Arabia is low, nuclear 
power plants capable of simultaneous production of water and electric­
ity are expected to be more appealing to the planners in the country 
2 
than will single-purpose plants. The requirsnents of dual-purpose 
plants using nucleaur fuel are generally the same as those for single-
purpose nuclear power plants. Nevertheless, three specific issues 
have to be considered in the dual-production plant, namelyi 
1. Impact of the availeibility and reliability of the desalina­
tion stage on the plant, 
2. Integration of the desalination amd power production stages, 
and 
3. New safety concerns of dual systems. 
Due to the safety requirements of nuclear power plants, the com­
ponents and material used in the construction must be of high quality 
and reliability. System design must include a high level of redundamcy 
and diversity to assure exceptional performance. Also, safeguard 
systems must be employed to prevent expected and postulated events, 
which could be detrimental to the safe operation of the plant, and 
which could lead to hazardous consequences. 
In contrast, desalination plants are designed to meet the demand 
at low cost. Thus, a desalination stage of low reliability or of 
numerous operational problems could affect the overall reliability 
of a dual-purpose nuclear plant, and may induce operation problems 
in the nuclear power stage of the plant. While the reliability of 
single-purpose nuclear power plauits has been extensively studied, 
the reliability of commercial desalination plants has yet to be 
considered. 
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The integration of the desalination stage and the nuclear power 
stage can be achieved through various schemes. The impact of the 
desalination stage on the plant depends on the degree of coupling 
between the power generation stage and the desalination stage. Loose 
coupling between the two stages is expected to have the least impact 
on the performance and operation of the plant. However, there are 
several issues to be considered in the analysis of the various inte­
gration schemes. Including cost, overall aved.lability, and techno­
logical viability. 
The safeguard systems of the nuclear syston are likely to protect 
it from the consequences of any unexpected accidents in the desali­
nation stage. Nevertheless, assessment of possible hazards from the 
operation of the desalination stage is required to assure the safe 
operation of the nucleaur supply. Also, the dual-purpose plant is 
likely to require some new criteria for the selection of sites. This 
is because it becomes essential for the plant to be close to raw water; 
hence, site selection becomes restricted. 
In this study, the three major issues discussed above are exaun-
ined in detail. In Chapter 2, a review is made of available desali­
nation schemes to select the processes most compatible with nuclear 
energy systems. Also, a literature review is given of earlier studies 
and concepts related to nuclear desalination. 
To examine the reliability of desalination systems, the operation 
history data of the Jeddah plants are selected. The Jeddah plants 
Include the oldest multi-stage flaush (MSP) desalination plant and the 
largest seawater reverse osmosis (RO) plant. 
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A description of the Jeddaih plants is given in Chapter 3, Opera­
tion experience of both the MSF and RO plants is presented, and causes 
of unscheduled shutdowns or reductions in water production are listed. 
MSF plant performance, operational conditions, and the most common 
causes of deviation from plant performance standards are considered in 
Chapter 4. Classification of failure modes amd affected systems are 
described, and actual operational data of MSF plant (Jeddah I) are 
analyzed for the period of the last eight years of operation and main­
tenance. Potential problem aureas and critical components are identi­
fied amd failure rates are calculated. 
The study provides a broad view on important systems and on re­
quired improvements on plant design which would assure the compatibil­
ity of the MSF plant with the nuclear energy system. Recommendations 
are made on this subject in Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 6, fault trees are drawn for the MSF plant. Ekphasis 
is given on three major systems. A quantitative evaluation is per­
formed, using the PREP-KITT computer codes to assess the probability 
of failure of the MSF plant. The study of system analysis results 
in the definition of some major causes and events lAich need to be 
imrpoved. A comparison of actual failure rates and industrial fail­
ure rates is listed. The conclusions of the study, and recommendations 
for improving the reliability of MSF systems aure given. 
The reliability amd operational experience of the RO plant aure 
described in Chapter 7. Two systems are analyzed, using fault tree 
techniques, as well as actual data extracted from operation and madn-
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tenance reports. The results of the RO plamt availability analysis 
are given for four cases of operation %Aiereln failure contributors 
are Identified and analyzed. Conclusions and recommendations for 
Improving plant availability are presented. 
Availability of desalination plants Is generally affected by 
factors, such as* 
1. Av2d.lablllty of components or materials, 
2. Manpower avad.lablllty and qualification, 
3. Operator training limitations, 
4. Maintenance practices, 
5. External and environmental condtions, and 
6. Fire hazards, etc. 
The increasing complexity of desalting plants demamds consider­
ation of the operational and maintenance aspects in the design phase. 
The accuracy of an evaluation of reliability and availability of a 
desalting system depends largely on the quality and the reliability 
of the historical data concerning these systems. 
This study uses fault tree techniques [1] to evaluate the re­
liability and availability of desalination systems. Critical areas 
of concern are identified, and methods of improving the performance 
of the plant are recommended. Failure data are extracted from op­
eration and maintenamce reports [2-4]. 
Reliability problems have been a major cause of poor performamce 
of desalination plants. Fault tree techniques and PREP-KITT codes 
have been used to study these problems. The emphasis of this work 
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is on the importance of availability modeling methodology for MSF 
and RO desalination plants reliability problems. These availability 
models provide a context in which the effect of unit unavailability 
can be qufmtified. 
An assessment is made of frequent failure and of outage causes 
to evaluate their impact on the availability of MSF and RO desalina­
tion plants. 
The single largest influence on the effect capacity of a water 
supply system based on MSF or RO desalination of seawater is the avail­
ability euid maintainability of the desalination plant. Forced outages 
Witch are a result of equipment failure are significant, but exter­
nally caused problems are also major contributor is to unit unavailabil­
ity. The design configuration of the desalination plant also effects 
the accepteUdility of the performance of water supply systems [5]. 
A comparison is made between RO and MSF processes in Chapter 8, 
from the point of view of reliability, safety, and compatibility with 
nuclear power as em energy source. Conclusions and recommendations 
for further work are given in Chapter 9. 
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2. SELECTION OF NUCLEAR DESALINATION SYSTEMS 
2.1. Desalination Processes 
Separation of water from salts in an aqueous solution can be 
accomplished by a number of processes. A brief review of the major 
processes is provided here to examine the compatibility of each process 
with nuclear power systems. 
2.1.1. Distillation 
In distillation processes, the solution is brought to a thermo­
dynamic state in vrtiich the more volatile component (H^O) is separated 
by evaporation from the less volatile salts. This state can be attained 
either by raising the temperature of the solution or by lowering the 
pressure at a constamt temperature. The first process can be done by 
either supplying heat directly, or by mechanically compressing the 
emamating water vapor to a higher pressure, which will produce a high­
er temperature. This process transfers heat by condensation to the 
evaporating brine [6]. 
The second process can be produced by condensing the vapors by 
using coolant with a lower temperature, in a vessel essentially evac­
uated of noncondensables. This process can be obtained by evaporating 
water from the ocean's surface in evacuated vessels, where the con­
densers are cooled by colder seawater from the sea. 
The three most common commercial desalination processes using 
direct heat are* multi-stage flash evaporation (MSF), multi-effect 
distillation, such as in the horizontal tube multi-effect (HTME), and 
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vertical-tube evaporator (VTE) concepts, or single-effect evaporation 
Until recently, large seawater desalination plants were of the 
MSP type; hence, an extensive operation history has accumulated from 
these plants, especially in Saudi Arabia. The advantages of the MSF 
process include economy of scale, the use of the well-developed process 
of evaporation, and the insensitivity of the quality of distillate to 
the feedwater salinity. The disadvantages include intensive energy 
consumption per unit of distillate (which makes the process uneconom­
ical for small size applications) and scaling and corrosion problems. 
Distillation processes consume energy in the form of heat, steam 
from the Nuclear Steeun Supply System (NSSS) can be used, either direct­
ly or indirectly. Thermal energy from the back pressure turbine of a 
nuclear system can be utilized in the distillation process. The di­
rect use of heat provides a high efficiency source of energy compared 
to processes using electrical or mechanical energy. Conversion from 
thermal to electrical energy involves loss of over 60% of the available 
energy in the conversion cycle. The MSF process is a likely candidate 
for utilization of nuclear power due to the large energy consumption, 
and because of the economy of scale which is a feature in both nuclear 
power plants and MSF plants. The multiple-effect process is adequate 
for utilization of waste heat from nuclear power plants. 
2.1.2 Freezing 
In the freezing process, the solution is brought to a thermo­
dynamic state in which the component with a higher freezing plant (H^O) 
separates itself by crystallizing within a saline solution. The saline 
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solution, then, becomes Increasingly concentrated, and consequently 
has a progressively lower freezing point. The crystals are then washed 
from the salt and consist of pure water. Naturally, lowering the 
temperature further below a given level, would start the precipitation 
of the salts, which Is undesirable In this process. Typically, the 
process operates between ~ -5°C (freezing temperature of seawater) an 
the ambient ad.r temperature (melting of product) [6]. 
Freezing has the advantages of low energy consumption emd the 
Insensltlvlty to the content of the raw feedwater. Freezing plants do 
not require any pretreatment. However, the freezing process has not 
reached the commercial demonstration stage, due to a variety of techno­
logical pr^lems. Including the difficulty in separation of product 
water from the refrigeramt. Freezing can utilize heat from NSSS; how 
ever, the low power consumption is likely to make nuclear energy a 
more expensive alternative of fossil fuels. 
2,1.3 Reverse Osmosis and Electrodialysls 
Two desalination processes utilizing the selective transport prop­
erties of membranes are Reverse Osmosis and Electrodialysls. In both, 
a membrane vrtiich hats a high rejection to the passage of one of the 
components (either water or salts) separates the high saline salt 
solution from the more dilute solution. To overcome the electro­
chemical potential difference which arises from this difference in 
concentration, and lAlch tends to create flows that reduce it, an op­
posing thermodynamic potential is applied. This potential is made large 
enough to generate a flux in the direction, which increasingly separates 
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the two components [6]. 
In reverse osmosis, this potential Is pressure applied to the more 
concentrated solution. It needs to be larger than the osmosis pres­
sure difference between the two solutions to provide a positive net flux 
of HgO through the membrane, towards the side vAilch has the lower salt 
concentration (the product side). 
In electrodlalysls (ED), the potential Is DC electric voltage, 
which makes the salt Ions move towards potentials of opposite sign. 
The solution needs to be placed between a cation-permeable membrane 
and an anlon-permeable membrane. The solution will gradually become 
depleted from the salt ions, lAich increase in concentration in the 
chamnels on the opposite sides of the membranes and %rlll, gradually, 
become desalted water. 
Membrane processes aure of modular nature; hence, the plant size 
does not have a slgnlflczmt Impact on the cost. Both the RO and ED 
can be powered by the electricity generated from a nuclear power plamt. 
The ED system has the advantage of being able to operate at various 
power levels and production levels. This flexibility provides a 
potential for using ED systems as a load-follow, thus producing more 
water at off-peak times than at peak power loads. However, the use of 
ED to desalt seawater is still in the development stage. 
2.2 Operation Analysis of Present 
Desalination Plants 
Desalination of seawater is perceived to be a means by which Saudi 
Arabia can meet the fresh water needs of a growing population and 
11 
industries. The reliability and safety of desalination plants are of 
papramount importamce,especially in considering the utilization of nu­
clear energy, 
Arad et al. [7] have analyzed statistical methods of determining 
a multiple effect plant operating factor to Identify tube availability. 
The assumptions used in that analysis rely upon considerable engineer­
ing judgment. In order to obtain a basis for the analysis, it was 
necessaury to hypothesize a model to describe tube failures. Using 
the model, tube reliability was determined by "extreme value statistics" 
for tube failure rates of the order of 0,001 in 10 years. 
The design, manufacture, and construction of one MGD HSF desalting 
plant has been discussed by Tidball et al. [8], The operating history 
and performance of the first 2.5 year period are presented. The effects 
of brine chemistry on corrosion, scaling, and heat transfer are dis­
cussed, along with a proposed method of selecting proper operating 
conditions. 
The commercial plant operating data and experience of five HSF 
plants have been presented by Hornburge et al. [9]. That study in­
cludes : performance data euid euialysis for a 3-year period, discussion 
of operating problems, corrosion control problems, and economic eval­
uations. The study provides insight into actual operating experiences, 
and contains chemical analyses of effluents from the plamts. The re­
sults of applying reliability and maintainability engineering analysis 
techniques to the desalting plant desigiv and evaluating the economics 
of applying these techniques» are presented by the Office of Saline 
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Water [10]. An Intensive analysis is defined for optimizing product 
water cost with respect to availability. Also, a plan is presented for 
developing a formal reliability and maintainability engineering program 
for the office of Saline Water, 
Steinbruchel [11] has evaluation of some causes of operating prob­
lems encountered in operating experience of MSF plants. Recent reports 
from water desalting plants reveal that a few of those plants operate 
substantially off design conditions. Most desalting plants are found 
to be unable to produce either the amount of pure water at expected 
cost or to operate satisfactorily over the full expected life of the 
system. 
The experience of Beurba et al. [12] in the design of MSF desalina­
tion plants has resulted in recommendations applicable, in paurticular, 
to the corrosion and fouling problems. The acid dosing process is 
superior to the polyphos|diate dosing process. The main features of 
the two long tube acid dosing-type plants are demonstrated. 
The Saudi AraLbia-U.S. joint team [13] reported the results of an 
effort to assess operating distillation plants, indicated design de­
ficiencies and operational problems, amd gave an estimate of present 
day water costs at these plants. The actual and design overall heat 
transfer coefficients for all plants under consideration have been 
compared. 
Cooper et al. [14] traced the development of desalination scale 
inhibitors from the early polyphosphate based formulations through to 
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the latest high temperature additives, Advamces in desalination plant 
technology are outlined, with special reference to the changing demands 
made on the additives. A comparison of acid and additive treatment 
methods is made, and the various basic mechanisms of scale formation are 
briefly covered, together with the principal plant design factors affect 
ing inhibitor efficiency. An attempt is also made to predict future 
trends in plant design, and the type of inhibitor required for success­
ful long term plant operation. 
Ten years of operating experience of a commercial MSF desalination 
plant have been studied by Gomez [15]. The analysis emphasized a 
variety of start up problems, and some operation problems. It also pre­
sented the total unit production cost for the plant during each year. 
Results of investigations of a MSF acid-treated plant are reported 
by Lohrl-Thiel et al. [16]. The studies include the corrosion problems 
of materials and the scale deposition in brine heater tubes. Most of 
the plant shutdowns are found to be due to the storage tanks being full. 
In spite of very difficult operation conditions, the plant has been 
operating satisfactorily for more than seven years. 
Scale control, corrosion, scale deposition theories, and the 
effects of many variables on scale formation have been discussed by 
Brandel and Riebe [17]. Outlined characteristics of common solvents 
used for chemical dissolution of scales have been examined, and some 
recommendations based on experience are offered which should yield 
maximum production, and insure plant availability. 
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The actual status and possible future of water reuse are discussed 
by El-Hares and Aswed [18] for existing MSP facilities. The study brief­
ly discusses construction problems and maintenance problems, and methods 
to solve such problems. 
Design features of MSP and RO plants are discussed by Nasrat and 
Balakrlshnan [19]. Scxne of the problems faced with such systems are 
discussed. Materials used in the construction of the systems are de­
scribed. Prom an analysis of the technical requirements and the average 
costs of production, a set of guidelines evolved and a plea is made for 
the drafting of standard specifications for equipment. 
Operation experience with various materials of construction in 
both low temperature, polyphosphate-treated evaporators, and also in 
high temperature evaporators using acid treatment has been described 
by Temperley [20]. The author refers to the repeated use of unsuit­
able materials and proposes a solution. The paper correlates operating 
conditions with selection of materials, and discusses the use of 
corrosion-resistant linings in actual operating experience. 
Basic information on the overall corrosion control program has 
been presented by Rcoieijh [21], and the effects of that program on 
both evaporator performance and distillation economics, aire shown. 
Also, an economic comparison between original emd present MSP plant 
operation is presented. 
Some of the scaling and corrosion problems which occur at MSP 
desalination plants have been studied by Mokhtar [22]. Pour prob­
lems are studied. Including the variation of seawater salinity, scale 
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formation at the brine heater tubes, acid treatment, and related cor­
rosion and scaling problems in MSP desalination plamts, and finally, 
liberation of brcxnine due to chlorine injection in seawater. The author 
suggested possible solutions and discussed the practical application of 
the solutions. 
The importance of availability modeling methodology to MSF desali­
nation plant reliability problems was studied by Unione et al. [23]. 
An assessment was made of failures and outages which impact the avail­
ability of MSF desalination plemts. Limited fault tree logic for system 
failures was developed and reliability data were incorporated. The de­
sign configuration of the desalination plant, the availability and the 
maintainability were found to have an impact on such a plant. The study 
focuses on the availability and reliability of a MSF plant with limited 
anaU.ysls and data. The fault tree logic was not developed to provide 
availability estimates as a vehicle for diagnosing performance loss 
problems. 
Performance amd relieUbllity analysis of RO plants has been pre­
sented by Unione et al. Fault tree analysis is Introduced as a tool 
to identify those plant components which aure prone to failure. Avail-
eUsility analysis can provide users with assurances of plant reliability 
and availability. The fault tree analysis is Illustrated, with an 
example of acid addition system availaibllity. 
Simulation of different operational conditions with the aid of a 
computer program is one of the best ways of assisting decision makers 
in the selection of the most economic mix of equipment for a dual-pur-
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pose plant, Gabbrlelli [24] used this approach, which deals with the 
economic comparison of plants consisting of MSF desalinators and 
combustion gas or back pressure steam turbines coupled to low capacity 
electric power generators. The results aze given in terms of yearly 
cost of production as the sum of capital, manpower, maintenance, fuel, 
and chemical costs. 
A review of the operation amd maintenance steps taken for trouble­
shooting, emd performance data of the largest reverse osmosis desali­
nation plant operating now in Japan is presented by Horio [25]. The 
paper discusses the problems experienced with the operation of the 
plant for eight years. 
Information regarding the development of the most appropriate pre-
treatment process, and evaluation of the pretreated feedwater quality 
are reported by Taniguchi [26]. This information has contributed to 
raising the membrane performance to a satisfactory level. The study 
gives plamt availaUaility and module replacement frequency per year. 
2.3. Review of Nuclear Desalination Concepts 
The development of the world's largest dual-purpose desalting 
and electric power plant, the first to be nuclear-fueled, is presented 
by Goodell and Wilson [27], with emphasis on the engineering and economic 
feausibility of the combination. The principal factors investigated in 
that study are, site selection, nuclear island design, selection of 
the desalting process, the combined plant concept, plemt capital cost, 
euid cost of desalted water. 
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The optimal process design of a dual-purpose plant for producing 
power and water was investigated by Fan et al, [28], A nuclear reactor 
is coupled with two water plamts, a multi-stage flash plant; and a 
reverse osmosis plant. The total system cost and optimal designs were 
presented for several combinations of water and external power demands. 
An analysis has been presented by Stamets et ai. [29] to describe 
the sensitivity of a system to parameter variation. The sensitivity 
analysis has been applied to the case of dual-purpose nuclear powered 
desalting plants. The physical characteristics of the system were used 
to guide the selection of the variables considered as fixed. The re­
sults were used to determine the proper systan design margins. 
The basic characteristics of the eight desalination plants studied 
are presented by Adar [30]. The technical feasibility of coupling 
standard condensing nuclear power stations to multi-effect horizontal 
aluminum tubes distillation plants is reported, amd the water cost was 
calculated. The result of the study shows that the coupling of a 
desalination plant to a nuclear power station reduces the cost of de­
salted water. 
Hedayat et al. [31] presented the results of a preliminary stage 
of the design of a 2,6 MGD MSP single-purpose 40 MW thermal heavy water 
nuclear power plamt. Design objectives and philosophy are reviewed. A 
description is given of the neutronic, thermal, control, and mechanical 
design parameters of the pleuit. The design is based on utilization of 
availzible local material, technology and manpower in Egypt. 
The Introduction of nuclear dual-purpose plants for water and power 
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production in Saudi Araibia was considered by Abdul-Fattah et al. [32]. 
Manpower and management requirements were discussed. The safety feature 
of high-temperature gas cooled reactors was presented. The reliability 
analysis of core auxiliary cooling systems was carried out by means of 
a fault tree methodology. The viability of using nuclear energy in 
desalting seawater was considered. 
The results of a study to develop a conceptual design and cost 
estimate for 25 M(S> seawater reverse osmosis desalting plants to op­
erate at both Caribbeam and Arabian Gulf sites atre reported by May et al. 
[33], The plants operate in conjunction with 100 MW nuclear power 
plants. Plant designs and cost estimates were developed. Technical 
and economic guide lines aure developed for submittal to membrane 
manufacturers. The plant capital cost and operating and maintenance 
costs were determined. The results showed that, although sayings are 
achieved *<Aien intake and outfall structures are ccmnon with a nuclear 
power plaiit, they are not as substantial as initially expected. 
The optimization of the simultaneous production of desalinated 
water and electrical power in a combined plant has been carried out 
by Kuenstle and Janisch [34]. The study was undertaken to find a way 
to reduce distillate production cost of a seawater desalination plant 
and to use surplus electricity for the public grid. The influences 
of the economic conditions and the plant configurations were shown. 
A preliminary study of the use of nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia 
is presented by Husseiny and Sabri [35]. The study Involved evaluating 
present systems and expected water and power demand. Small power 
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reactors with natural uranium or highly diluted enriched fuel were con­
sidered, along with a preliminary survey of possible sites resulted in 
selection of suitable site for both nuclear and desalination plants. 
The problem of integrating the nuclear power plant into desalina­
tion systems is considered by Goldsmith [36], assuming that the instal­
lation is designed for optimum conditions and that it will drive the 
maximum amount of by-product power per unit of steam from the largest 
possible heat drop in the turbine, from the nuclear boiler and exhaust 
to the distillation plamt. He addressed the loeid variation problems 
and he discussed the frequent fluctuations in output. 
Special emphasis on dual-purpose nuclear desalination plant types, 
sizes, problems of operation, and availability is considered by Masters 
et al. [37]. They selected dual systems employing back pressure or 
passout turbines feeding distillers to produce water. The nuclear plant 
proposed uses a light water saturated-steam direct cycle, that is, the 
feedwater is pumped into the reactor, where it is changed to steam, \riiich 
is then passed to the turbine. In this type of reactor, steeun gathers 
some radioactive matter, but experience has shown that this does not p 
present insuperable operating and maintenance problems. Steam gen­
eration heavy water reactor (SGHWR) is the most likely to be competitive 
in the lower output ranges. 
The fast breeder reactor as a heat source for desalination plants 
has been discussed by Langley et al. [38]. Some technical operating 
conditions, and flexibility were given, in the dual-purpose liquid metal 
fast breeder reactor (LMFBR), several possible variations in the cycle 
which provide flexibility of operation, such as desuperheating the steam 
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or altering the steam expansion line to provide an intersection with the 
optimum brine heater inlet conditions are considered. Advantages of the 
IMFBR-powered desalination plant is presented. 
Nuclear dual-purpose plants for electric power and desalination 
plant using pressurized water reactor are examined by Drude and Rohl 
[39]. For the coupled generation of heat and power, there exists a 
variety of flow schemes. These schemes are the pure back pressure 
cycle, the extraction scheme cycle, and the combination of back pres­
sure and condensing turbines cycle. The advamtages and the disadvan­
tages of these cycles are given. 
Reviews of technical information presented by Brice and Yashin 
[40] on the combination of various reactor types in single- or dual-
purpose arrangements with desalination plants have been made. Several 
water reactor types - BWR, PWR and DgO moderated are characterized by 
low saturation steam conditions. Also, the application of gais-cooled 
reactors to dual-purpose plamts has been considered where coupling to 
the desalination plants was through back pressure or extraction turbines. 
Two concepts have been studies which use a closed cycle gas turbine. 
The utilization of the available waste heat by MSP plant is discussed. 
Table 2.1 illustrates some characteristics of different types of 
reactor and possible arrangements with MSF desalination plants. 
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Light water reactor (LHR) 
(BWR, PWR) or heavy water 
reactors (Candu) 
1. Low Saturated steam conditions 
2 .  High ratio of water to power 
production 
3. Back pressure or extraction 
turbines 
Gas cooled reactor 
(HTGR or AGR) 
1. No low pressure turbine and no 
reheat stages 
2 .  Back pressure or extraction or 
closed cycle gas turbines 
3. Waste heat to be used in desali­
nation 
4. High efficiency 
Orgamic cooled 1. Simplification of design and 






Utilization of uranium reserves 
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Water problems are so numerous and diversified that no single plan 
or course of action appears capable of solving them. It is apparent 
that desalination will contribute to the solution or alleviation of 
water supply problems. Multi-stage flash and reverse osmosis desalin­
ation units are already supplying potable water in many places. It 
appears that the greatest demand in the immediate future will be for 
conversion plamts having very large capacities of desalinated water 
and power; hence, nuclear power appears to be the only answer. The 
use of nuclear energy in saline water conversion is found to be es­
sential in Saudi Arabia, where very large requirements exist for 
water. 
A desalination plant requires large amounts of low-grade heat. 
Rather them generate this heat in a special plant, it is cheaper to 
generate high-grade heat and extract most of the useful work in a 
power station until the temperature has dropped to a point where the 
heat can be used in the desalination plamt. Experience gained in 
design, start up, and operation of desalination plants can be taken 
as a basis for future plants with nuclear heat. 
2.4. Nuclear Desalination Couplings (KSF) 
In the following, some possible basic schemes of combining nuclear 
power plants with desalination plemts are discussed. 
2.4.1. Back pressure cycle 
All the steam produced after expansion in a back pressure turbine 
is condensed in the brine heater, thus raising the brine to the re­
quired temperature before evaporation. 
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Indeed, If the brine temperature is increased, causing the pres­
sure of the heating exhaust steam of the turbine to rise, the heat 
consumption of the desalinating plant is decreased. 
The ratio of water to electricity will be higher in the case of a 
nuclear plant delivering saturated steam to the turbine. 
In this scheme, the exhaust-steam pressure is usually controlled 
by the inlet valve v^ as shown in Figure 2.1, the turbo-generator set 
thus taking no part in the cwitrol of the grid frequency. Nevertheless, 
it must be possible to vary the electrical load according to the demand 
by adjusting the brine flow. 
If the electricity supply is to be decreased, the brine flow 
should be adjusted to a lower level, in order to prevent too great a 
pressure drop of the heating steam. Such a drop can be avoided by set­
ting up a by-pass line, thus ensuring a higher load factor of the steam 
source. The fresh water produced by means of by-pass line is more ex­
pensive, because the steam has been expanded through a reducing valve 
and has not produced any electrical energy. 
The case of a breakdown of the desalting plamt is considered. 
The solution would be to introduce a small flow of cold brine into the 
brine heater amd to reject the waunn brine into the sea. The brine 
heater should be divided into several parts which could be cleaned in 
turn. Finally, the back pressure turbines have a low efficiency at 
partial loads, although they have a high efficiency at the design output. 
A back pressure turbine has certain advantages from the point of 
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Figure 2.1. Dual—purpose plant, back pressure cycle; flow diagram 
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sive and gives a lower overall thermal efficiency, 
2,4.2. Pass-out condensing cycle 
The turbine is divided into a high pressure and a low pressure 
section, as shown in Figure 2.2, the heating steeun being extracted be­
tween the turbines. The remainder of the steam after this extraction 
is expanded in the low pressure sector of the turbine, which operates 
as a normal condensing machine. The valve v^, located between the 
extraction point and the low pressure section inlet, controls the 
pressure of heating steam and operates as an overflow valve. A water 
to electricity ratio can be easily adjusted. When fresh water produc­
tion is at its maximum rate, a small steam flow has to pass into the 
low pressure section of the turbine in order to maintain the possibility 
of pressure control and to prevent the exhaust from overheating. A de­
creased turbine efficiency occurs with high production of water. 
2.4.3 Combination of several desalinating processes 
It should be of interest to consider one desalinating plant which 
uses one process requiring heating steam, euid another which uses electri­
cal energy, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
In such a plamt, the steam source, the turbo-generator set, and 
the flashing unit would always be running at full load. The variations 
of electrical demand would then be immediately reflected back to the 
























Figure 2.3. Dual-purpose plant utilizing t%fo different desalinating processes 
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2.4.4. Comparison of different coupling schemes 
Review of the various schemes of coupling nuclear power plants to 
desalination plants shows that the back pressure cycle would be more 
useful in the case of a nuclear plant. The back pressure cycle allows 
for a load-follow operation scheme that saves in energy. This scheme 
is also more flexible and more reliable than other schemes. 
2.5. Comparison Between Single- and Dual-Purpose 
Nuclear Desalination Plamts 
The following are some advantages and disadvantages of single-
purpose and dual-purpose installations for producing energy for distil­
lation processes. 
1. A dual-purpose plant is more economical than single-purpose 
plant [41]. 
2. A single-purpose plant is easier to operate than a dual-
purpose plant. 
3. Nuclear energy is more appropriate for a dual-purpose plant 
than for single-purpose installations. 
4. A dual-purpose plant gives water and power while single-
purpose pleuits give either water or power. 
5. A dual-purpose plant would permit flexibility at better 
economic conditions. 
6. A single-purpose plant allows the use of a large standard 
design NSSS. 
7. Water can be stored so that the fresh water producing sets do 
not have to follow the water demand instantaneously, and can 
be stored Wien the electricity demand decreases, thus ensuring 
a high load factor for the steam source. Also, the desali­
nation systems would go off line for maintenance and in­
spections in a dual-purpose plant. 
It appears possible to build a nuclear steam supply system to 
provide fresh water and electric energy. Reliable and tested turbine 
designs are available, which, with some modifications, can provide the 
optimum operating conditions and high availability. 
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3. THE JEDDAH DESALINATION PLANTS 
3.1. Background Information 
The city of Jeddah, situated on the coast of the Red Sea, is the 
largest port and most important commercial center of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. Jeddah covers an area of about 190,000,000 square meters 
and is the most densely populated city in the Kingdom, The 1974 census 
shows that Jeddah had a population of about 565,000 at the end of 1974. 
Assuming that the annual population growth rate of 10 per cent during 
the past five years continues, Jeddah's population vrill be over 850,000 
by the end of 1979. Jeddah's climate is subtropical with a hot, humid 
sumner, and warm winter months with occasional scamty rainfall. The 
average annual rainfall is a little less than ten centimeters per year 
142]. 
The city of Jeddah has always been plagued with water supply prob­
lems because of the great increase in industrialization and the conse­
quent increase in population. Table 3.1 lists the seawater desalination 
projects in operation in Jeddah. 
Table 3.1. Seawater desalination and power plants operating in Jeddah 
Number of Design capability Desalination 
linatd 
units 
desalination ^ water MGD 
Jeddah I 2 50 5 MSF 
Jeddah II 4 80 10 MSF 
Jeddah III 4 200 20 MSF 
Jeddah seawater 9 - 3.2 RO 
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In addition to the rapid increase in water demand, water supply 
from desalination plants is the main source of water for Jeddah and the 
surrounding area, Hence, the availability of these plants is of major 
concern. However, no work has been done on reliability analysis or on 
availability improvement. The objectives of this research are to 
evaluate the reliability concerning the plants at Jeddah, to draw 
recommendations for reliable design and operation, to ensure high 
plant availetbility. 
3.2. Dual-purpose Desalting Plants 
3.2.1. General description of Jeddah I MSF plant 
The plant is located on the eastern shore of the Red Sea. The 
plant consists basically of identical twin steam generating units, 
electric power generating units, amd seawater desalting units, with the 
necessary auxiliary systems to operate these units. At full capacity, 
the plant can produce 50 MW of electric power, and five MGD of potable 
water. 
The general arrangement of the seawater MSF desalting plant is 
shown In Figure 3.1. It consists of six horizontal evaporator modules 
on a single tier arrangement. There is a total of 42 stages, which are 
located in the heat rejection section and the heat recovery section. 
The desalination plaint is capable of operating at reduced capacity. 
The major equipment and services are controlled and monitored from the 
control room, but there are local manual controls used for start up, 
shutdown, and abnormal operation [43]. 


























Figure 3,1. Jeddah I MSP desalting plant aurranqement 
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The most Important systems which affect plant availability are 
divided Into three main systems as follows, 
3.2.2 Desalting plant 
A flow diagram of the Jeddah SMF plant is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Generally, MSF plants have the following subsystemsi 
3.2.2.1. Evaporators 
Externally, all shells of the evaporators contain a single nest 
of condensing tubes, with a waterbox on each end. 
Internally, a typical stage is made up of two tube support plates 
and an inner tube sheet bolted to the partition plate. The paurtltlon 
plate and inner tube sheet sepeurate one stage from the next stage. The 
brine flows from one stage to the next through brine gates, trfiich ex­
tend fully across the floor of each stage. The condensing tubes are 
mechanically expamded into the holes in each end tube sheet. The dis­
tillate trough extends from partition plate to partition plate, and a 
damper in the partition plate permits distillate flow between stages. 
The purpose of the deaerator which is mounted into the top section of 
the stage, is to remove dissolved air in the maJce-up water flow. 
3.2.2.2. Air extraction system 
Each air extraction module has three sets of twin steam-driven 
air ejectors, a hogger, and four shell- and tube-type condensers. 
The condensers are all operated with cooling water \^lch flows 
through the tube side, with the vents condensing on the shell side. 
The air ejectors euid condensers are used at the time of the plant 
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Figure 3.2, Process flow diagram for 2.5 MGD Jeddah I MSF desalination plant 
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evaporator stage. In normal operation, they draw noncondensatole gases 
from the brine heater, each evaporator stage, and the deaerator, 
3.2.2.3. Make-up system 
The make-up system is used to provide treated make-up water for 
the evaporator process. It Includes decarbonator pumps and decarbon-
ators. The pumps are used to pump and make-up water through the 
decarbonator system and ultimately into the deaerator spray nozzles. 
In the decarbonator, the carbon dioxide is removed and sulfuric acid 
and amtifoam compound are injected. 
3.2.2.4 Brine system 
The brine system consists of a brine heater, which heats the re­
circulating brine flowing on the tube side to the required terminal 
temperature, the brine recycling pumps, which circulate the brine 
through the tubes of the evaporating plant, the brine heater, and 
finally, the brine heater condensate pumps, which pump the collected 
condensate either to the power plant deaerators or to the condensate 
storage tanks. 
3.2.2.5. Slowdown system 
The function of the blowdown system is to remove the highly con­
centrated brine after it has passed through all of the evaporating 
stages. It consists of blowdown pumps, which discharge blowdown into 
the seawater discharge tunnel. 
3.2.2.6. Sulfuric acid system 
The function of the sulfuric acid system is to control scale and 
maintain a pH value that inhibits corrosion formation. The system 
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consists of a sulfuric acid tank and sulfuric acid pumps. 
3.2.2.7. Seawater Intake system 
The seawater Intake system furnishes screened, chlorinated sea-
water to the evaporators for conversion to potable water. The main 
components of this system are* traveling water screens, an offshore 
seawater Inlet, screen wash pumps, seawater chlorlnatlon facilities, 
and three circulating water pumps. 
The traveling screens sepeurate flotsam and marine life from 
the Incoming seawater. 
The seawater chlorlnatlon system controls the growth of marine 
life. 
The screen wash system function clears the mesh of the travel­
ing screens of clogging particles. 
3.2.3. Steam generation facilities 
The condensate make-up subsystem, the condensate-feedwater sub­
system, two Identical steam generators (boilers), together with a common 
main steam and auxiliary steaun distribution system, are the major com­
ponents of the steam generation facilities. 
3.2.3.1. Boiler 
Each steam generator (boiler) is supplied with feedwater from one 
of two identical condensate-feedwater trains. The steam boiler aux­
iliaries consist of the fuel oil burners, their ignition facilities, 
soot blowers, atomizing steam piping, combustion air heating and de­
livery facilities, dust collection, and flue gas disposal equipment. 
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3.2.3.2. Steam distributions 
The steam distribution facilities of the plant consist of a com­
mon main steam system, a common auxiliary steam system, six bleed steam 
systems, a common extraction steam system, and a desuperheated steam 
system. The main function of such systems Is to distribute such steam 
to the plant equipment. 
3.2.3.3. Condensate-feedwater systems 
Two separate trains of condensate-feedwater equipment are provided, 
one for each boiler. 
Each train of equipment is designed to collect, circulate, deaerate, 
reheat, and deliver to the boiler the condensate which accumulates In 
the hot well of the main condenser. 
The principal components of each condensate-feedwater system are: 
the main condenser and Its hot well, two full capacity condensate pumps, 
one low pressure heater, one deaeratlng heater and its storage tank, 
two half capacity feedwater pumps, and two high pressure heaters. 
3.2.3.4. Condensate make-up system 
The condensate make-up system can provide, store, and deliver a 
demlnerallzed water to any or all of the followingt the desalination 
system, the steam generation system, and the electric generation system. 
The subsystem components are condensate transfer pumps, demlneral-
Izer, condensate storage tanks, and emergency make-up pumps. 
3.2.4. Electric power generation 
The electric power generation facility is composed of the follow­
ing main equipment> two steam turbines, and two generators-one for 
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each unit. The diesel electric generator is used to provide plant 
start up power, and to serve as an emergency back up power in the 
event of an auxiliary transformer going out of service. Finally, 
two groups of 15 KV cable buses are used to connect the generator 
terminals to their respective circuit breeJcer terminals and to the 
auxiliary power transformer terminals. 
3.3. Operation of MSF Plants 
Traveling screens are designed to handle 24,000 gpm of seawater 
per unit, and to remove all solid particles of 10 mm diameter or larger. 
Malfunction of the traveling screens would lead to different types of 
failure, including blockage of the screen and an insufficient flow of 
seawater. 
Manual and auto switches close if the pressure differential across 
the screen exceeds 8 inches of water (due to buildup on the screen) 
to wash off the debris. The screen system is equipped with two pumps 
to take suction from the intake structure and discharge into a 5 inch 
header to the traveling screen and the chlorination facilities. 
Pipelines to the traveling screens are fitted with a shutoff 
valve, a flow control valve, a pressure switch connection, and a spray 
nozzle [43]. 
Each of the two screen wash pumps is capable of providing enough 
water to wash all three screens simultaneously. The pump and the screen 
controls are interlocked with each other with a differential pressure 
switch at each screen, so vAen a differential pressure of 8 inches 
of water is reached across any one or more of the screens, the screen 
wash pump will start. As soon as the pump builds up a pressure of 
80 psig, the pump discharge header, a single pressure switch, will 
actuate the solenoid valves and cause all three valves to open. Simul­
taneously, any or all the traveling screens will begin rotating. When 
washing action lowers the differential pressure to 4 inches of water, 
the screens will slow to the lower speed, Wiile the spraying action 
continous. When the differential pressure falls to 2 inches, the 
operating screens and the screen wash pump will stop. 
A mixture of chlorine gas and water is intermittently fed to sea-
water in the intake structure to control the growth of marine life in 
seawater lines and equipment. Three circulating water pumps with 
rated capacities of 24,000 gpm operate supply to supply the pleuit with 
raw seawater. Two pumps can supply water to both desalting trains. 
Each pump, together with its discharge valve and its lubricating water 
supply valve, is operated through one control switch, located in the 
control room [43]. 
The pump emd the connected valves are interlocked with one another 
so that the pump cannot be operated ageiinst a closed discharge valve 
or without lubricating water for the pump bearings. Additionally, the 
pump and the valves are interlocked with a pressure switch and a level 
switch. This will prevent the pump from starting if either the lubri­
cating water pressure or the intake compartment level is too low. 
Sulfuric acid is pumped from the sulfuric acid storage tank and 
delivered into the acid mixing chamber at a rate controlled by the 
appropriate flow rate of the make up water, in order to get a pH valve 
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of 6-6.5 of the seawater. Two acid pumps are provided, one for duty 
and one for standby. The pump rating during normal operation is 156 
kg/h of 98% sulfuric acid. The pump is controlled by the flow rate 
of the make-up water. The acid mixing chamber is a vertical cylindri­
cal vessel with interval baffle plates which ensure complete mixing of 
the acid with the make-up water. The make-up water is mixed with the 
sulfuric acid in the acid mixing chamber, and is then allowed to fldw 
into the make-up water decarbonator, where the carbon dioxide content 
is reduced [43]. 
The make-up water decarbonator is a rectangular shell with spray 
nozzles and packings. The make-up water is emitted from the spray 
nozzles and flows down on packings, allowing the ceurbon dioxide to 
evolve freely. This process is carried out under atmospheric pressure. 
A decarbonator blower is used to supply stripping air currents, which 
mix with the evolved gases. The mixture then passes out to the atmos­
phere from a gas outlet through the demisters at the top of the de­
carbonator. The make-up water then flows down to the bottom of the 
decarbonator. There, its level is controlled at a specified level by 
the decarbonator level controller. From the decarbonator, make-up water 
flows into a vacuum deaerator by means of a vacuum drag. There, the 
noncondensable gas content is reduced under vacuum conditions. The 
make-up water then flows down to the bottom of the vacuum deaerator, 
in ^ ich its level is controlled in connection with the brine level at 
the last stage. From the deaerator, the make-up water flows into the 
last stage of the heat rejection section by meeuis of their level 
difference [43]. 
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Brine flows from one stage to the next stage at a specified level, 
which prevents pressure equalization in the stages. The produce water 
condensed at the condensing tube is collected in the product water 
through, amd flows to the next stage. The product water is discharged 
from the outlet box at the last stage. The brine outlet box at the last 
stage is divided into two paurts* one for brine recirculation, which is 
diluted with the make-up seawater, and «mother for brine blowdown. The 
recirculation brine then passes through the condenser tubes of the heat 
recovery section, and through brine heater. 
In passing through the condenser tubes, the brine is heated by 
condensing vapor flashes, evaporated from the brine in each stage. The 
recirculation brine is heated up in the brine heater. The brine flows 
from the brine heater into the first-stage fleish chamber. The brine 
continues to flow through successive stages, flashing in each stage of 
the flash chamber. The brine is now of high concentration, and, as 
stated before, a part of it is discharged and the remaining is mixed 
with the make-up water and recirculated by brine recirculation pumps 
[43]. 
3.3.1. Stage by stage analysis of MSF 
The process of multi-stage flash evaporation technique is to heat 
the seawater under sufficiently high pressure to prevent boiling. 
Flashing occurs as soon as the pressure is released. By releasing the 
pressure in small steps, a system emerges vdiich facilitates a high 
degree of internal heat recovery. The water condenses its own vapor, 
and a high heat economy is achieved. 
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First consider a vessel, such as shown in Figure ".3, in which a 
salt solution is being vaporized in the lower part and recondensed on 
cold tubes in the upper part. Next, assume that the same amount of 
water is to be produced, but allow the vaporizing to occur in two stages 
in adjoining vessels. From the two diagrams, a number of features are 
evident; 
1. Flows have remained the same. 
2. The same amount of product water has been produced. 
3. Condenser tubing area has doubled. 
4. The two-vessel configuration costs about twice as much. 
5. Only half as much thermal energy has been added to produce 
the same amount of water. 
The operating principle of MSF plants is to maintain the pressure rela­
tionship in a series of stages as . Then, as preheated 
water is introduced into each stage in succession, part of the water 
will flash until the water temperature is again in thermodynamic 
equilibrium with the vapor pressure in that stage. As flashing occurs, 
the temperature of the brine decreases in an amount proportional to the 
quantity of vapor produced. As the vapors are flashed off the brine 
stream, its dissolved solids concentration increases,and its temperature 
decreases. Tubes carrying cooling water intercept and condense the 
water vapor. 
Each stage is vented through an orifice to the next lower pressure 


























Figure 3.3 Multi-stage flash vessels 
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brine heater to vessel VlOl 
vessel VlOl and V102, stages 2-16 
vessel V102 and V104, stages 17-32 
vessel V105 and V106, stages 33-42 
Venting is necessary to remove noncondensable gases from the desalina­
tion flash chambers, if these gases accumulated, they would insulate 
the condenser tube surfaces and adversely affect the transfer of heat 
and the desalination plant perfomumce. So, the initial vacuum in each 
desalination module is created by using the venting system. 
3,4. Reverse Osmosis Plant 
The plemt layout is shown in Figure 3.4, which shows the pretreat­
ment system, the reverse osmosis system, and the post-treatment system 
[43]. 
3.4.1. Pretreatment system 
The pretreatment system consists of alum feed, dual media filters 
the clearwell, amd acid and phosphate addition, followed by filteration 
to facilitate backwashing. Acid is injected into each stream to adjust 
the feedwater pH. Phosphate is injected to inhibit scale formation. 
After chemical treatment, each stream is filtered, to promote chemical 
mixing and to remove suspended solids. 
3.4.2. Reverse osmosis system 
This system consists of two stages. The first-stage is composed 
of nine trains. The second-stage is composed of three RO units. 
Thus, each of the nine first-stage units produces 0.439 NGD. Each of 
o 




Figure 3.4 Reverse osmosis plant layout 
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the three second-stage units is capable of producing 0,611 MGD of 
product water. Thus, the second-stage units will operate at 85% 
recovery. 
3,4,3. Post-treatment system 
Lime is added to the product water to stabilize and raise the 
pH of the product water. Also, chlorine is added to sterilize the 
product water, 
3.5. Operation of the RO Plant 
Seawater flows by gravity into the intake seawater pump well. A 
cleanable screen and trash rake in the seawater pump «rell prevents fish 
or trash from entering the seawater supply pumps. During normal opera­
tion, two of these three pumps will be in service, while the third is 
on standby. If the intake line becomes plugged euid the water level 
in the seawater pump well drops, the Low Level Alarm indicates this in 
the Control Room, and the Level Switch shuts down all three pumps [44], 
The discharge pressure is 25 psi from seawater supply pumps. The 
flow of seawater is normally regulated by the Motor Operated Valve. 
An alum solution can be injected just upstream of the Inline Blend­
er, which rapidly mixes the alum with the seawater. In the event that 
the Alum Addition Pump is shut off, the inline blender also shuts off, 
A polymer coagulator may be added to improve filterability. It 
can be injected just prior to the Static Mixer, which is just before 
the splitter box for the dual media, sand, and anthracite filters. Each 
of these filters has à single backwashwater storage tank. Air scrubbing 
is included as part of the backwash cycle. 
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Either Jockey Pump pumps water from the clearwell into the dual 
media filter. The bac)wash tanks then need to be refilled. This keeps 
the clearwell full, regardless of how much water is being withdrawn by 
the Filter Effluent Transfer Pumps. In normal full operation, two of 
these pumps are in use, while the third is on standby [44]. 
In the event that the level in the clearwell drops too low, a 
signal from a level switch will shut the pumps down sequentially. 
There aure nine identical first-stage reverse osmosis units. Either 
of the units would be required when the full second-stage is in opera­
tion. 
It is necessary to lower the pH to between 6 and 6.5 to prevent 
precipitation of calcium caurbonate on the manbrane surface, vrtiile 
minimizing the production of carbon dioxide. Sulfuric acid is pumped 
by pump from the Day Tank into the feedwater line upstream of the 
cartridge filters. The operation of this pump is controlled by the 
pH meter [44]. 
A solution of sodium hexametaphosphate is pumped from the 
tank into the feed line upstream of the cartridge filter. 
The Cartridge Filter protects the main feed pumps and elements 
from any large particles which may have cone from the dual media 
filters, or fallen into the cleaurwell. It also functions as a mixing 
chamber for the sulfuric acid and for the sodium hexametaphosphate. 
The feedwater is pressured by pumps. These pumps operate in parallel. 
A loss of feedwater, eis indicated by a low pump suction pressure 
causes the main pumps amd also t-he Acid injection Pump to shutdown. 
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When one of these units is shutdown, a signal opens a solenoid 
Vent Valve, to depressurize the permeate. A check valve in the permeate 
line prevents loss of permeate from the other units through this vent 
[44]. 
If the quality of the combined permeate from the first-stage units 
exceeds 1,000 mg/liter TDS, a portion of this can be processed with 
a second-stage unit. 
A pump pressurizes 500 gpra of water from the first-stage permeate 
line to approximately 400 psi. Excessive discharge pressure will shut­
down the pump. 
Whenever these units are shutdown, the permeate vent valve opens to 
depressurize the permeate line. A check valve prevents loss of permeate 
from other units through this vent valve. 
Hie permeate streams from each of the reverse osmosis units are 
combined and then flow into permeate tank [44]. 
3.6. Shutdown or Decreased Production 
Some of the causes of unscheduled shutdown or reduction in water 
production are: 
1. Scale removal (acid cleaning), 
2. improper maintenance, 
3. Intake structure maintenance, 
4. Water box repair, 
5. Tube plugging and replacement, 
6. Temperature imbalance, 
7. Adjustments of venting, vacuum, pressure lines and evaporator. 
8. Coastal storms, 
9, Human errors, 
10. Corrosion and leakage, 
18. Loss of fuel, and 
19. Loss of chemicals. 
The forced shutdowns can be categorized as followst 
1) transient operational failure, 
2) replaceable component failures, auid 
3) major breakdowns. 
The transient operational failures arise from trivial faults, such as, 
the spurious tripping of safety devices, or human error. In such cases, 
the plant should be restored to operation within a few minutes or am "hour. 
The replaceable conponent failures depend on many factors, such as, 
availability of the component from stock, policy or stocking, etc. 
The major plant breakdown can be of far more serious consequence. 
The complete destruction of a recycle pump or serious fire damage 
are both examples of major plant breakdowns. 
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4. MSF OPERATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATION 
OP NUCLEAR DESALINATION PLANTS 
4.1. Categorization of Failure Modes and System Affected 
4.1.1. General data analysis 
Monthly operation reports on the multi-stage flash plant at Jeddah 
[2-4] are used to extract operational data, to identify failure modes and 
estimate failure rates. These reports contain information on total 
water and power production, disturbances and emergencies which led to 
unit shutdown, planned shutdowns, a brief summary on the type of main­
tenance performed during the month on all units and components, and 
finally, some monthly figures on the running hours of each unit. How­
ever, often insignificant events eure documented in detail, while neces-
saury details of failure descriptions are not given. Since the infor­
mation is limited, careful investigation is needed to identify component 
failures and events. 
4.1.2. Initial start up problems 
A vauriety of staurt up problems are encountered amd various tech­
niques are employed to cope with these problems. During the start up, 
numerous operational problems were encountered, and a series of exten­
sive delays caused am unprecedented number of plamt start up and shut­
down cycles. The high corrosion rates which were accelerated by this 
intermittent mode of operatioi\ resulted in even more delays. During 
the first year of operation, the plant was on amd off due to the follow­
ing problemsI 
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1. Severe corrosion in the venting system, evaporator stages and 
pipework, etc. 
2. A strong wide washing loose stones and sand into the intake 
channel. 
3. The diesel generator was unreliable. 
4. Brine recycle pumps inlet and discharge valves and blowdown 
suction valves were extremely stiff to operate. 
5. Oesuperheater system did not work adequately. 
6. Distillate was contaminated by ceurry-over of brine. 
7. There were acid leaks at the point of injection. 
8. The steam line to the evaporators was improperly designed. 
9. There were electrical and instrumental components defects. 
10. There were scale control problems. 
11. Modifications and repairs were needed. 
Experience has proven that operation with many start up and shut­
down cycles creates more problems than continuous operation, even if the 
plamt production satisfies the demand for water. 
4.1.3. Modification and repairs 
After commissioning the plant for operation, some modifications and 
repairs were done in the plant, including the following; 
1. Venting system pipes were replaced by stainless steel pipes. 
2. All vessel-l from stage 1-8 were lined up with stainless steel 
plates. 
3. The by-pass line between the outlet of brine recycle system 
and the blowdown system was insulated to keep the plant in pro-
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ductlon, so only partial shutdown is required. 
4. Demister support was replaced by stainless steel angles and 
rods. 
5. A new decarbonator tower was installed. 
6. A fiber cast pipe was installed from the decarbonator sump 
to the level control valve on stage 42. 
7. Complete retubing was put on the brine heater of evaporator-l. 
These are some of the essential modifications amd design changes which 
have been implemented to mitigate the extent of the operational and 
design problems which appeared during plant operation. 
4.1.4. Significant events 
A brief sumnary of the most significant events which have occurred 
during the MSF Jeddah I plamt operation period is presented here, since 
these events impact the operation, maintenance, efficiency, emd reli­
ability of desalination plamts. In general, these events are relevant 
to nuclear desalination pleuits operation and design. Lessons learned 
from such occurrences provide guidelines for improvement of the per­
formance of newly designed plants. 
In 1972, Unit II was shut down for six days to allow for an inspec­
tion by the Office of Saline Water (O.S.W. ) and Aqua-Chem (manufacturer), 
various outsteuiding jobs were completed, such as cleaning, repair, and 
replacements in all systems of Unit II. 
Also, the ejector condensers of Unit II were running with badly 
leaking tubes since the order for complete sets of tubes for each of the 
condensers had not arrived. In August, Unit I was shut down for nine 
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days to enable this unit to be inspected and surveyed by a Lloyd's 
insurance inspector. Some of the problems encountered in that year 
were; 
1. ConsideraUale leaks had developed on the mild steel stub 
pipe beyond the condenser, and large amounts of hot water 
were sprayed over plant and personnel. 
2. Severe corrosion had developed in the venting system euid water-
boxes, and most of the brine gates in the evaporators had fal­
len or were about to fall. 
3. The venting system was very unsted>le, due to ejector condensers 
being only partially effective. 
Another problem arose in the increased demand for water, and conse­
quent reluctance to shut down the unit to carry out remedial work in the 
plant. This problem kept the plant working at severe operating condi­
tions. 
In 1973, a major effort was made to keep the evaporators operating 
to combat the effects of the corrosion affecting both evaporators, and 
a great effort was made to repair the recycle brine pumps. Some failures 
had been discovered after finishing maintenance work lAich led to shut­
down of the unit. The evaporator had run throughout the month using 
only one brine recycle pump while work on repairing the other pump was 
progressing. 
The venting system caused problems, and some modifications such as 
pipe work were fitted to both brine recycle system and blowdown system. 
The plant was running while some components were in poor condition, and 
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bad operating conditions were experienced due to a high level of CO^. 
Also, the low reliability of the instruments affected the operating 
conditions of evaporators. Some organic fouling occurred, due to 
dredging operations in the seawater intake channel. This operation 
resulted in the removal of large quantities of sand and coral rubble 
from the intake channel. On the other hand, the corrosion - rate inside 
the evaporator was very rapid and discouraging, especially in the 
first vessels. Also, the linings were corroding badly; holes were found 
in the bottom of several stages through the linings. 
In 1974, due to corrosion of the evaporator internals, the plant 
was shut down for maintenance and repair for a ^ rlod of not less than 
two weeks for each evaporator. During this shutdown, the first vessel 
was lined with stainless steel and the vent pipes were replaced. The 
corrosion of the waterboxes was very rapid, and holes in the waterboxes 
were found, which eventually became larger and were welded up. 
In 1975, the waterboxes were cleaned and a major modification of 
Instruments was done. Also, a loss of power occurred due to Saudi 
National Electric Compamy (SNEC) disturbances. 
In 1976, work on retubing the brine heater led to shutdown on 
evaporator II for some times. The venting system pipe was retrofitted 
by replacement of the stainless steel pipe and demister support in all 
stages. This modification was done on evaporator I. Also, a new 
decarbonator tower was Installed and complete retubing of brine heater 
of evaporator I was carried out. 
In 1977, the waterboxes between vessel 3 and vessel 4 outlets, to-
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gather with the pipe connecting them was renewed. The total plant was 
shut down twice to connect the seawater, distillate pipes, steam lines, 
and return condensate of Jeddah II plant with Jeddah I plant. Also, 
the waterboxes between vessel 4 and vessel 5 were renewed. 
In 1978, the plant was shut down due to condensate failure in 
one of the pumps while the other pump was under maintenamce. Heavy 
rain seepage to the terminal boxes of the turbines led to total plant 
shutdown. Other problems were caused by the seawater intake channel 
blockage. Loose earth from the reverse osmosis plant and heavy amounts 
of silt and sand blocked the seawater intake and damaged the seawater 
pumps, forcing the pleuit to shut down. 
In 1979, a major source of outage was the disturbemces in the SNEC, 
and the resulting loss of power. The brine heater failure was another 
contributor for plant outage, and finally evaporator I waus shut down 
for upgrading and retubing of all vessels. 
In 1980, both evaporators were down for upgrading and retubing. 
4.1.5. Operation and maintenance data 
Based on the actual operating experience of the Jeddah I multi­
stage flash desalination plant, data are extracted through a review of 
monthly reports of events occurring in the plant from January 1972 to 
May 1980. Component failure rates are calculated and the data are then 
analyzed to determine the significance of various types of failures, and 
to identify those critical components which would disturb plant opera­
tion or lead to other failures. 
The totaJ. number of failures during operation and maintenance for 
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all systems are listed in TaUble 4.1 for different ages of the plant. 
Itie component failures exhibits cyclic increase euid decrease, with 
age which indicates imperfect repairs and inadequate maintenance and 
replacement program. Table 4.2 gives the degree of impact of component 
fatilures on systems from 1972 to 1980. This is presented as the number 
of system failures in a given year compared to the total number of 
component failures. The t«d)le shows the systems which are more prone 
to failure. 
Table 4.1. Component failures amd plant outage in the period Jemuary 
1972 to May 1980 (Jeddah I MSF plant) 
Year Number of component 
fad-lures 




1972 63 ,36 6120 
1973 117 39 7626 
1974 122 36 8283 
1975 89 28 6711 
1976 96 26 6305 
1977 127 48 7633 
1978 89 45 8152 
1979 114 66 6350 
1980* 38 1 221 
*Prom January to May, 1980. 
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Table 4.2. Degree of Impact of component failure on systems 1972-1980 
(Jeddah I MSF plant) in percentages 
System Year Total 
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Evaporator 1.17 3.27 5.88 2.92 2.81 5.26 2.1 3.98 0.82 28.19 
Make-up 
water 2.22 1.64 1.75 0.94 1.17 0.94 0.35 1.4 0.58 10.99 
Vacuum 0.47 0.94 1.05 0.24 — 0.24 0.24 0.35 — 3.52 
Brine 
recycle 1.17 4.21 2.33 2.57 3.39 2.8 3.98 4.09 1.4 25.96 
Sulfuric 
acid 0.47 0.71 1.29 1.17 0.71 0.93 1.05 1.75 0.23 8.32 
Slowdown — 0.58 0.23 0.23 0.71 1.17 0.35 0.23 0.23 3.71 
Seawater 
intake 1.4 1.87 1.75 1.64 2.34 2.69 1.75 1.06 0.7 15.21 
Distillate 0.47 0.47 — 0.7 0.12 0.82 0.58 0.47 0.47 4.09 
Total 7.37 13.68 14.28 10.41 11.23 14.85 10.4 13.32 4.43 100.00 
The evaporators suffer to a great extent from various component 
failures. The other three systems which show different component prob­
lems are: 
1. brine recirculation system, 
2. seawater intake system, and 
3. treated make-up water system. 
The most important component failures are those capable of inducing 
failure in the system or plant. The diagnostics of the failures lead­
ing to malfunction in a given system or equipment would indicate causes 
of failure and also provide a measure of component availability. Table 
4.3 gives the total number of failures that led to system failure for 
each component. Pumps have a great Impact on system failures. Pipe 
failures are significant in the acid and make-up systems. All systems 
have valve problems. Both evaporator and brine heater tubes lead to a 
system failure due to corrosion and scale formation. Severe corrosion 
has been experienced in the waterboxes of the evaporators. Table 4.4 
shows the impact of different components on each system. Pump 
failures have dominated all systems except the acid system, in vrtiich 
pipes cause the major problem because of acid attacks and corrosion. 
In the evaporator and vacuum systems, tube leakage and plugging are 
other sources of problems in these systems. 
Table 4.5 provides a yearly outage duration data for each system, 
which caused the plamt to shut down. These data cam show that the 
major contributors tc plauit outage are the evaporators and the 
brine recycle system. 
TaUble 4.6 provides representative outage data and the number of 
component failures in each system which led to unit shutdown. The 
average downtime and causes are presented in Table 4.7. About 91 
per cent of the outage duration is due to system failure, maintenance, 
and general overhaul of both evaporator units. Eight per cent of 
outage duration is due to loss of power. The miscellaneous sources 
of outage include heavy rain, inspection, and environment. These 
outage durations include scheduled and forced downtime for maULntenance 
and repairs. Duration for some events is estimated from similar 
events of outage duration. 
Table 4.3. Number of failed components leading to system/subsystem failure in Jeddah i MSP plant 
System/Subsystem 
Component Seawater Make-up Evaporator Brine Blowdcwn Vacuum Distillate Sulfuric 
intake water recycle brine acid 
Pumps failure 72 31 — 118 22 — 29 23 
Pipes failure 2 21 2 3 — 10 — 31 
Valves failure 22 19 12 32 8 1 3 13 
Haterbox 
failure — — 67 — — — — —— 
Tubes failure — — 61 55 — 16 — — 
60 
Table 4.4. The impact of component failure in each system percentage 
(to total # in each system) 
System Total number 
of failure 
Pumps Pipes Valves Tubes 
Seawater intake 147 53 1. 4 15 — 
Make-up water 99 39.4 21. 2 20.2 — 
Evaporator 241 —— 0. 83 4.98 25.31 
Brine recycle 212 56 1. 4 15 26 
Slowdown brine 32 68.75 ~ 26 — 
Vacuum 30 
— 33. 33 3.33 53.33 
Distillate 35 82.86 — 8.57 
— 
Sulfuric acid 71 32.39 43. 66 18.31 — 
Table 4.5. Total downtime for each system caused , by component failure 
Duration (h) 
System 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 Total 
Evaporator 265 215 235 193 641 750 162 187 2648 
Make-up water —— 17 
— 96 5 2 24 — 144 
Vacuum 502 280 97 —— —— 4 — —— 883 
Brine recycle 40 83 14 52 462 20 203 489 1363 
Sulfuric acid 




Slowdown brine —— 176 11 2 240 126 — 55 610 
Total 807 787 357 411 1366 905 389 731 5753 
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Table 4.6, Component failures and Its total outage for each system 







Evaporator 2648 89 30 
Make-up water 144 5 29 
Vacuum 883 14 63 
Brine recycle 1363 66 21 
Sulfuric acid 105 7 15 
Blcwdown brine 610 18 52 
Total 5753 199 
Total 4.7. Oitage 
plant 
duration (h) per 
(Jeddah I MSF) 





Loss of Miscellaneous Total 
power 
1972 2605 35 — —  2640 
1973 1085 49 ~ 1134 
1974 355 70 52 477 
1975 2049 0 — 2049 
1976 2450 5 —— 2455 
1977 898 93 136 1127 
1978 493 115 — 608 
1979 1095 1247 68 2410 
1980* 7075 — — 7075 
Total 18105 1614 256 19975 
Percentage 90.6 8.1 1.3 100 
*Bor period from January 1980 to May 1980. 
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4.1.6. Significant problems In MSF plant 
The most significant problems in MSF plants are scale formation 
and corrosion. The analysis of monthly reports for Jeddah I shows that 
the areas that have major corrosion/erosion problems are waterboxes, 
brine heater tubes, ejectors, pipe works adjacent to control valves, 
and feed treatment equipments. 
Extensive corrosion has occurred throughout the plant, indicating 
problems in design, fabrication, static tes ing, and operational testing. 
A review of monthly reports showed that severe corrosion took plance 
throughout the evaporator, it was revealed that the main areas of 
corrosion were on the faces subjected to direct Impingement of brine, 
and on the evaporator floors and vertical surfaces of all flash stages 
There had been floor leaks in different stages. Also, the manhole rings 
and covers on the module were badly corroded. Most of the waterbox 
leaks have been eliminated by lining the boxes with Cu-Ni. This lining 
is being welded on severely-corroded caurbon steel waterboxes without 
quality control to check pinhole defects in welds. These pinhole leaks 
still appeau: in locally-lined waterboxes, and offer problems. 
Some of the operation problems experienced in the Jeddaih I MSF 
desalination plant during the last nine years at different locations in 
the evaporator modules are* 
1. Heat recovery condenser tubes. The accumulation of corrosion 
products in the tubes of the condensers was due to the following: 
a. corrosion scale "flakes" 
b. corrosion sludge. 
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Flakes of corrosion products from the evaporator vessels enter the brine 
stream and are circulated to the recovery condenser inlets, then become 
lodged in the tube ends of the first recovery bundle, resulting in 
either partial or total plugging. Partial plugging can lead to local 
high velocities, and total plugging decreases available heat transfer 
surface. Sludge blankets in internal tube surfaces decreeise effective 
heat transfer rates. This results in lowering plant thermal performance. 
Both forms of corrosion products increase pressure drops in these 
bundles. This results in increased pumping cost and/or lower pro­
duction rate. 
2. Extensive corrosion in flash chambers. After reviewing the 
MSF operation reports, it is found that severe corrosion was taking 
place in all vessels of the evaporators. The main areas of corrosion 
are on the faces subjected to direct impingement of brine; hence, the 
major cause of this corrosion attack was associated with high velocity 
impingement of brine on target areas. An additional cause for the ex­
tent of the corrosion encountered was the mode of operation of the plant. 
During the laist eight-year period, there %rere more than 325 shutdowns 
and startups. Extensive corrosion above the demisters and particularly 
within the internal vent ducts was found during the last eight years of 
inspection. A continual course of trouble has been air in-leakage due 
to corrosion of the external walls. The interstage brine gates have 
corroded severely, increasing the brine orifice size between many of 
these stages. 
3. Heat rejection condenser tubes. Tube bundles are susceptible 
to corrosion and erosion. They are subject to raw seawater internally, 
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and corrosive gases externally; hence, they were prone to early fail­
ure. The seawater pumped through the tubes may contain high amounts 
of sand, mud, and sometimes marine growth and debris. These can cause 
corrosion and/or partial plugging of the tubes. Paurtlal plugging of 
a tube causes high local velocity and erosion of the tube surface, 
which eventually leads to tube failure. Additionally, the external 
surfaces of these tubes are often exposed to corrosive gases that are 
released from the Incoming feed make-up. 
Another severe problem associated with the heat rejection con­
denser Is the periodic blocking of the tubes at the inlet end from 
marine growth (shells). These shells not only restrict the flow of 
cooling water through the rejection condenser tubes, but %*en they are 
lodged In the Inner tubes, create local high velocities and have caused 
some tube failures. Operation experience revealed several problems 
caused by the type of materials used In the construction of the Jeddah 
I plant. A summary of the materials used In the construction of the 
Jeddah I plant Is presented In Table 4.8. 
Evaporator shells were constructed of carbon steel, and after a 
few years of operation considerable leak: appeared In the high tempera­
ture module In the flashing brine area of the flashing stage due to 
corrosion. To stop leakage, the flashing brine stages in the high 
temperature module were lined with stainless steel up to the demisters. 
The brine orifices, stage dividers, and brine guides were constructed 
of carbon steel-these having corroded severely, especially in the high 
temperature stages. Some sections of the vent lines and fittings were 
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Table 4.8. Materials of construction 
Material Jeddah I 
A. Evaporator shell c.s .  
Brine tray lining First 8 stages lined with S.S. up to 
demlster 
Brine gates 316 S.S. 
Product trays C.S. Cu-Nl lined 
Vent nozzles S.S. 
B. Tube bundle 
Brine heater tubes 90 - 10 Cu-Nl 
Recovery tubes 90 - 10 Cu-Nl 
Reject tubes 90 - 10 Cu-Nl 
Tube sheett 
Brine heater 90 - 10 Cu^l 
Recovery 90 - 10 Cu-Nl 
Reject 90 - 10 Cu-Nl 
Haterbox t 
Below 180® C.S. 
Above 180° C.S., Cu-Nl lined 
C. Brine heater 
Shell C.S. 
Waterbox C.S., Cu-Nl lined 
D. Piping 
Flashing brine ^ C.S. 
Deaerated brine > 180 C.S., Cu^l lined 
Deaerated brine < 180° C.S. 
Product piping C.S. 
Vent piping C.S. 
Undeaerated SW C.S. 
fabricated out of carbon steel. These sections soon corroded away, al-
lowing considerable leakage of air into the vacuum system. Piping was 
changed to stainless steel, and most leaks were eliminated. 
The present evaporator heat recovery vessel is lined with stain­
less steel which is in good condition. The manhole rings and covers on 
the module were of carbon steel emd badly corroded but were replaced. 
Most of the tubes in the reject and recovery module failed, probably 
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because of manufacturing defects. The brine heater Is completely 
sealed with a deposit of hard calcium sulfate scale; the plugged 
tubes in the vessels (VlOl) and (V106) failed due to low pH opera­
tion and local erosion caused by debris, shell, and rust chip lodg­
ment. Carbon steel brine stages will eventually require lining in 
all the recovery stages. Waterbox leaks are a major problem area, . 
euid most of the leaks have been or are being eliminated by lining 
with Cu-Ni. Carbon steel brine recycling pipes and flashing brine 
pipes still leak and experience severe corrosion, requiring frequent 
maintenance. Vent piping was originally of carbon steel, which has 
corroded away. Later, this was changed to stainless steel. The 
distillate pipe for discharge from the distillate pump is caurbon 
steel and has failed. Ejector nozzles are of stainless steel and will 
require replacement. Piping between vent condensers was of carbon 
steel and has corroded away. This is being replaced with stainless 
steel. Vent condensers have mamy plugged tubes. The decarbonator 
blower was made out of carbon steel and has corroded away. The vacuum 
system is not working at capacity because of erosion in the nozzles and 
plugged tubes in the vent condensers. A review of the materials used 
in the construction of pumps is presented in Table 4.9. 
In many cases, the material for the bowls/diffusers and inlet bells 
is Ni-resist. On inspection, the Ni-resist was often found to be cracked 
auxl broken - causing failures of shaft and couplings, along with damaged 
impellers auid wear rings. The carbon steel wells have also been a 
severe source of failure due to seawater attacking them from the outside. 
Holes in the wells cause air leakage and the wells almost invariably 
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Table 4.9. Materials of construction for centrifugal pumps 
Component Material Type 
































sit in stagnant seawater and should be coated on the outside with em 
asphalt-type coating. The stainless steel recycle pump shafts were 
severely corroded, probably because of stagnant seawater corrosion dur­
ing shutdowns or low pH brine. 
Table 4.10 gives the major problem areas in each system and the 
estimated downtime for each component^ where pumps represent the most 
potential problem area in all systems. Waterboxes and tubes are another 
source of trouble in the plant,due to corrosion and scale formation. 
4,1.7. Critical components 
ïtie critical components are defined on a basis coomensurate with 
availability of the plant. These critical components identify where 
improvements would most benefit plant reliability etnd availability. 
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Table 4.10. Major problem areas 




Waterboxes Evaporator 67 L',pb,cif 1786 
Tubes Evaporator 61 L,P 1993 
Pipe Make-up 21 L 
d 
NA 
Control valve Make-up 19 
e 
P NA 
Decarborator pump Make-up 16 P NA 
Oeaerator pump Make-4ip 15 P NA 
Tubes Vacuum 16 L.P NA 
Pipe Acid 31 L 196.3 
Pump Acid 23 P NA 
Pump Distillate 29 F NA 
Pump Slowdown 22 P 692 
Pump Seawater intake 50 P NA 
Wash pump Seawater intake 22 P NA 
Brine heater tube Brine recycle 55 L,P 957 
Pump Brine recycle 67 P NA 
Condensate pump Brine recycle 33 P NA 
Plow control 
valve Brine recycle 27 P NA 
= leaJcage. 
as plugging. 
^CL = cleaning. 
*^NA = not available. 
®F - failure. 
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Table 4.11 shows the most critical components, the systems, and number 
of failures for each component. Failure of these components will lead 
to system failure, and therefore, plant shutdown. 
Several factors cause these components to fail, such as design, 
materials selection, operation, and maintenance conditions. A survey 
of components failure and events for the seawater intake is summarized 
in Table 4.12. This provides a good illustration of events which are 
anticipated to lead to outages, where pumps are the main source of un­
availability to the system since the start up of the plant. It seems 
that the frequency of malfunction of these pumps is increasing with 
time. Also, the screens are another contributor of system unavail­
ability, which caused some other components to fail. The table indi­
cates that some failure events aure not reported, due to insufficient 
documented data. 
Table 4.13 summarizes failure events of the make-up water system 
for the same period. Pipe leeUcage and failure of motor operated valves 
are the major source of system outages, which have different causes, 
such as improper material of construction and inadequate operating 
conditions. 
Pump failure and tube leatkage of the brine heater are the mad.n 
indicators of unavailability of that system. 
Tube failures have many causes, including improper material, scale 
formation, corrosion, emd maintenance. Table 4.14 shows that the prob­
lem of these tubes is increasing with time, and a new brine heater has 
been installed recently. 
Table 4.11. Critical component in each system and number of failures 
Evaporator Make- Vacuum Brine Acid Blowdotm Seawater Distillate 
up recycle intake 
Pipe — 21 — — 31 — — — 
Pump — 31 — 100 23 22 72 29 
Valve — 19 — 27 — — — — 
Tube 63 — 17 55 —» — — — 




Table 4.12. Sunmary of operational data reported for seawater InteJce 
system 
Event Year 
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 Total 
Contamination of seawater -------3- 3 
MOV f a i l e d  - 2 2 1 2 - 2 - 3  1 2  
Pipe leak/rupture 1-1 - -- -- - 2 
Mechamical failure of CW pump 185957852 50 
Motor failed to operate -3--12-- - 6 
Breaker short circuit 1--1----- 2 
Manual valve failed 5-1-11-11 10 
Mechanical failure of wash 
pump 1 — 66342 — — 22 
Mechanical failure of screen -11127-21 15 
Pressure sensor failed 14-1133-2 15 
Blockage of intake structure -------3- 3 
Table 4.13. Make-up water components failure and applicable time 
Event 
72 73 74 75 
Year 
76 77 78 79 80 Total 
MOV failed 3 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 - 19 
Oeaerator pump mechanical 
failure 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 3 15 
Deaerator failed 2 2 
Nozzles failed 3 1 4 
Oecarbonator pump mechanical 
failure 2 3 2 3 2 4 — — — 16 
Pipe leak/rupture 5 4 6 - - 1 2 3 - 21 
Blower mechanical failure - - - 2 - - 2 1 5 
Motor blower failed - 1 - - 3 1 - - - 5 
Motor failed to operate 3 3 - 1 - - - 1 8 
Oecarbonator tower failed - 1 - - - 1 - - 1 3 
Pump vadve failed - 1 1 
72 
Table 4.14. Brine recycle components failure emd applicable time 
Event 
72 73 74 75 
Year 
76 77 78 79 80 Total 
MCV failed 4 5 1 2 5 2 - 5 2 27 
Pipe leak/rupture 1 1 - - - 1 - - - 3 
Recycle pump mechanical 
failure 2 10 7 5 9 11 14 7 2 67 
Tube leakage - 3 - 4 3 2 14 29 - 55 
Motor failed to operate - 8 5 1 2 - - - 2 18 
Condensate pump mechanical 
failure - 3 5 3 3 4 10 6 1 33 
Breaker short circuit - 1 1 - - . - - 2 - 4 
Pump valve failed to open 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 - - 5 
BH leak/rupture 1 1 
4.1.8. Performance standards 
A complex system, such as a MSF desalination plamt, is composed of 
various redundant and nonredundant components. The relationship between 
individual component availability and system availability is not a 
simple functional relationship. For a normal period of operation of 
a desalination plant at full load, some required plant performance 
standards are given in Table 4.15, showing interactions between system 
failures. Also, the plant performance standards for each module of an 
MSF plant are given in Table 4.16. 
The most coranon causes of deviation from plant performance stan­
dards are given in Table 4.17 in order to simplify fault tracing; causes 
of deviations are also given. These failure modes are the most important 




Seawater 6,205,000 87 14.696 42,000 8.2 36,000 Make-up 
intake water 
Effect on Evaporator 
system X X — — — — X •* Vacuum 







system X XX — X X X 
Brine 6,578,340 102-250 varied varied 4 10 6-8 87,000- Evaporator 
recycle Effect on 108,000 
system X X X X  X X X X 
Slowdown 2,170,690 102 — 52,000 4 10 6-8 108,000 Evaporator 
brine Effect on 
system X — — — X X X 
Vacuum varied varied varied varied 4 10 6-8 Make-up 
Effect on water 
system X X X X  X X X —— Evaporator 
Distillate 868,655 100 — 500 4 10 6.8-7. 2 5,000 Vacuum 
water Effect on 
system X —— — X X X X X 
Temp. Press. TDS CO O pH (|aMH06) Systems 
,p°, 
(mg/l) (PPb) of this 
system 
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Table 4.16, Desalination modules performance standard 
Recycle brine inlet Distillate Recycle brine outlet 
Flow rate Temp. Press. Flow rate Temp. Flow rate Temp. Press. 
(#/HR) (F®) (PSI) (#/HR) (F®) (#/MR) (F®) (PSI) 
Module 1 6,579,340 250 26 188,690 219 6,389,710 221 16 
Module 2 6,389,710 214. 5 15.6 366,220 190 6,212,120 192 9 
Module 3 6,212,120 192 8.6 531,580 162 6,046,760 164 4. 8 
Module 4 6,046,760 164 4.5 683,400 154 5,894,950 156.5 2. 5 
Module 5 5,894,950 156. 5 2.3 802,430 112 5,775,910 114.5 1. 3 
Module 6 5,775,910 114. 5 1.2 868,655 100 6,578,840 102 0. 9 
Table 4.17. Causes of deviation from plant performance standards 
Failure mode Cause 
Incorrect product level poor heat balance 
poor vacuum 
poor adjustment of flashing device 
incorrect last stage product level 
Incorrect brine heater outlet 
temperature 
poor control heating steam 
poor control brine heater desuperheater 
poor venting of brine heater 
brine heater condensate level 
brine heater tubes scaled 
Poor vacuum poor heat balamce 
air leeUcage in module, deaerator, 
condensers 
air leakage in vent line to condensers 
low steam pressure to condensers 
plugging of nozzles in condensers 
high drain level in condensers 
high drain level in desalination 
condenser. 
Impure product water incorrect brine level in evaporator 
foaming 
poor heat balance 
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Table 4.17. (continued) 
Failure mode Cause 
demlster Improperly installed 
damage of condenser tubes in evaporator 
Poor performance of decarbonator Incorrect acid dosing 
blower failure 
spray nozzles failure 
Poor performance of deaerator air leaking in deaerator 
poor vacuum 
spray nozzle failure 
stripping steam shortage 
Imparl^ of brine heater conductivity instrument 
condensate brine heater tubes damaged 
Impure heating steam 
Low product water production low brine heater outlet temperature 
low recirculation brine flow 
poor vacuum 
pure product dumped to «raste 
product through leakage 
sludge formation in evaporator tube 
Incorrect condensate level In incorrect control setting 
brine heater LCV-7 failure 
poor brine heater heat and mass 
Incorrect brine level poor heat balance 
Make-up flow line fall 
decarbonator blower failure 
poor vacuum 
Incorrect last stage brine level 
poor adjustment of flashing device 
causes of deviations and are occurring more frequently In the Jeddah I 
MSF plant. Most of these failure modes are considered In the construc­
tion of fault trees. 
The consequences of systems failures on plant performance are Il­
lustrated In Table 4.18. These modes of failure are being considered 
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Table 4.18. The Impact of system failure on plant performance 
System failed Consequences for deviation from plant standard 
Brine recycle incorrect brine heater outlet temperature 
impurity brine heater condensate 
low product water production 
incorrect condensate level in brine heater 
Make-up water incorrect product water level 
incorrect brine level in evaporator 
poor vacuum 
impure product water 
Vacuum incorrect product water level 
impure product water 
poor performance of deaerator 
low product water production 
incorrect brine level in evaporator 
Evaporator incorrect product water level 
poor vacuum 
impure product water 
incorrect brine level in evaporator 
Seawater intake loss of production 
loss of vacuum 
poor performance of evaporator 
impure product water 
Slowdown brine incorrect brine level in evaporator 
poor performance of evaporator 
Distillate water loss of production 
incorrect product levels 
Steam incorrect brine heater outlet temperature 
poor vacuum 
poor performance of deaerator 
impurity of brine heater condensate 
loss of production 
in the fault trees for the following three systemsi 
1. seawater intake system, 
2. make-up water system, and 
3. brine recirculation system. 
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The interaction of MSP plant systems euid the relationship between these 
systems are shown in Figure 4.1. The seawater intake system is shared 
by the vacuum system, the make-up system, and the evaporator vessels. 
Table 4.19 illustrates the pressure and temperature in each stage 
of the HSF plant, where the drop in temperature from stage to stage 
is assumed to be constant. 
Table 4.19. MSP plant, standard performance 
Stage Temperature (°F) Pressure (PSI) 
1 243,5 26.8 
2 239.9 24.97 
3 236.2 23.22 
4 232.6 21.97 
5 229 20.4 
6 225.3 19.2 
7 221.7 17.86 
8 219.1 16.53 
9 214.5 15.53 
10 210.9 14.53 
11 207.5 13.5 
12 203,7 12.50 
13 200,0 11.53 
14 196.5 10.6 
15 193.5 9.98 
16 189.3 9.14 
17 185.8 8.57 
18 182.2 7.85 
19 173.7 7.3 
20 175.1 6.72 
21 171.6 6.25 
22 168.6 5.75 
23 164.6 5.34 
24 161.1 4.86 
25 157.6 4.5 
26 154.2 4.11 
27 150.7 3.81 
28 147.3 3.45 
29 143.9 3.20 
30 140.5 2.90 
31 137.2 2.70 
32 133.4 2.47 
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Table 4.19. (continued) 
Stage Temperature (°F) Pressure (PSI) 
33 130.6 2.28 
34 127.2 2.05 
35 123.9 1.89 
36 120.6 1.70 
37 117.3 1.56 
38 114.1 1.43 
39 111.0 1.31 
40 107.2 1.17 
41 103.1 1.04 
42 98 0.89 
4.1.9. Implication of the MSF operational experience on nuclear 
desalination plants 
The analysis of the operation history of the MSF desalination 
plants at Jeddah reveals some very important factors which can help 
us to assess the implications of adopting MSF technology in the design 
of a dual-purpose nuclear plant in the area. The emphasis has been 
placed on availability and reliaUbility, firstly to avoid prolonged 
outages, and secondly, to match the performance of the reactor. 
The medn factor that has emerged as a result of over nine years 
experience with MSF desalination is the inherent reliability of the 
heat transfer surfaces and pumps. To minimize operational problems, 
the energy source should have high reliability so as to provide a 
steady steam supply to the desalination plamt. Also, the experience 
from the desalination plants shows that the following main points need 
to be considered in the design of nuclear desalination plants based 
on MSF technology. 













































Figure 4,1. MSF systems interactions 
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possible, in order to prevent a caurry-over of brine drops and 
corrosion. 
Temperature peaks should be prevented because local overheating 
will considerably increase the danger of scaling in the tubes. 
The flexibility of a dual-purpose plant is a very important factor 
because of the need to vary plant output of water and power accord­
ing to the demand for each. Two main components of a nuclear dual-
purpose plant, the reactor and turbogenerator, must be operated at 
varying load without much difficulty, to produce for seasonal de­
mands. The flexibility of the entire plant depends, in addition, 
on the combined response of its components. 
It should be noted, that high capacity is necessary in a nuclear 
facility, not only to ensure economic operation but also because 
of the nature and magnitude of the task involved, since low-
potential heat must be available in very large amounts to meet 
power requirements, and to meet present and future demand for 
fresh water. 
The present desalination plants require the use of materials amd 
equipment which are commercially availeible. 
Technical problems of presently operated desalination plants need 
to be solved to assure safe operation of nuclear desalination plants. 
There must be an experienced staff to operate and maintain these 
plants. Nuclear technology requires special training of technicians, 
operators, and engineers, due to the high level of sophistica­
tion, safety provisions, emd complexity of the systems. 
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8. The present site of the desalination plant is on the West Coast of 
the Red Sea, which is considered part of the city. This location 
is not a suitable site for a nuclear power plant, because of safe­
ty requirements. Nonetheless, the reactor should be as close to 
the city as permitted, otherwise extensive piping network and 
power grids are needed. 
4.2. MSF Plant Failure Rates Calculation 
4.2.1. Introduction 
Reliability and availability of the desalination plemt is a major 
design criterion, especially if nuclear energy is used as power source. 
Component reliability problems have historically been a major cause of 
poor performance of MSF desalination plants. Frequent component fail­
ures in the desalination stage of a nuclear dual-purpose plant based 
on MSF technology will dictate the overall plant performance and safety. 
This is because of the fact that a system with high standards of safe­
ty, material, equipment, and operation cannot meet the expected safety 
and performance standard if coupled to a system with less stringent 
standards. 
An assessment is made of failures and outages which have an impact 
on the availability of the following three systemst 
1. seawater intake system, 
2. make-up water system, and 
3. brine recirculation system, 
since operation experience has shown that these systems are the most 
valuable to failure in MSF plants. The analysis includes an extensive 
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review of operating data undertaken to diagnose and accurately quantify 
the effect of system faults. 
4.2.2. Seawater Intake system 
The principal operating problem encountered during the entire 
period of operation was the inability of the seawater Intake system to 
reliably and efficiently remove the foreign material suspended in the 
incoming seawater. 
Failure of this system is Intolerable in the operation of flash 
distillation plants having no secondary source of seawater. Aside from 
the cost of labor and special equipment required to keep the plant 
operating, sudden interruption in sea%#ater flow subjects the heat ex­
change equipment to thermal shocks, and sealing develops. 
Foreign material, including marine vegetation, sand, silt, fish and 
stones, was found in the Jeddah plant seawater Intake system. Table 
4.2 shows that approximately 15% of the total component failures were 
because of seawater intake system failure. 
Table 4.20 focuses on seawater intake components, and failure rates 
for each component »Aiere pump malfunctions and screen failures are the 
major problem areas in this system. Patrts of the traveling screens in 
the wetted area were made of carbon steel; these items have completely 
failed. Since the Intake is em open channel cut through the coral hea4 
and because of wave action, surface debris as well ais small stones is 
carried into the intake traveling screens; hence, seawater should 
be taken below the surface in the deep sea, or sea wells may be used to 
exclude this debris. Also, traveling screens had a severe corrosion 
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of rails and other parts. Corrosion of the drive mechanism Is one of 
the major causes of failure In the seawater screening systems. 
Table 4.20. Seawater Intake system failure rates (MSF plant) 









Actual Industry (hour) 
Contamination 
of seawater 70 70 60 [10][46] 
Insufficient dose 
of chlorine — 30 30 4 [2] 
MOV fails to function 29 8 29 18 [2][10][46] 
Pipe leak/rupture 35 68 35 16 [2][10][46] 
Mechanical failure of 
CW pump 290 100 290 20 [2][10][46] 
Motor falls to 
operate 13 13 13 10 [45] [10] [46] 
Breaker short 
circuit 4 11 4 5 [45] [10] [46] 
Mechanical failure 
of wash pump 192 68 192 20 [2] [10] [46] 
Mechanical failure 
of screens 87 74 87 56 [2][10][46] 
Test and maintenance 
errors on pump 62 17 62 5 [45 ] [46 ] 
Test and maintenance 
on MOV 17 17 17 5 [45 ] [46 ] 
Operator errors on 
pump 6500 6500 5 [45 ] [46 ] 
Operator errors on 
MOV 6500 6500 5 [45 ] [46 ] 
Pun^ line down for test 
amd maintenance 3333 3333 48 [45 ] [46 ] 
Blockage of intake 
structure 52 WW 52 60 [10] [46] 
All screens plugged —— 2000 2000 56 [5] [46] 
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Table 4.20. (continued) 
Event Failure rate x 10~^ Value Repair Sources 
(per hr) used_^ time 
Actual industry 
Manual valve failed 
to remain open 22 4 22 18 [2][10][46] 
Pressure sensor of 
screen failed 35. 30 35 5 [45][10] 
The seawater pumps suffered both from the inadequacy of the mate­
rials specified and the high concentration of silt and organic material 
it had to hamdle. Some of the major causes of pump failure are listed 
below: 
1. bearing and gleuid failure, 
2. suction problems or cavitation, 
3. thermal shock failure, and 
4. graphitization of cast iron. 
Also, another major cause of pump failure is diverse operation condi­
tions, as well as maintenance conditions. 
The major failure modes for most of the seawater intake system 
are corrosion, erosion, and cavitation, or a combination of all three, 
as shown in Table 4.21. Failure of these components leads to system 
failure, vAiich means that the component lost its ability to perform as 
required. 
Failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA) are performed for the 
following component functions, since most Improvement in plant avail­
ability can be realized by improving these components ; 
Tatble 4.21. Failure modes and effect analysis of seawater intake system 
Component Type Function Environment Failure Failure Effect on Cause 
rate* 10"* > systan 
(per hr) 
Traveling Moving Remove sea- Seawater, Blockage, 87 System failure Corrosion 
screen wed & 42000 ppm. driver sludge accumu­
marine life 87°F failure lation 
Seawater Centrifugal Supply sea­ Seawater, Pump end 290 Pump emd system Corrosion/ero­
pumps vertical water to 42000 ppm. and failure sion, foreign 
all plant 87®p driver matter lodged 






Screen Turbine Clear the Seawater, Pump end 192 System failure Same 
wash vertical mesh of the 42000 and 
pumps screens of 87°F driver 
clogging fad.lure 
particles 
Seawater c.s. Conveys Seawater, Leak/ 35 Leaks and even­ Corrosion/ 
piping seawater 42000 pgm. rupture tual failure. erosion & 
to the 87°F, 36" if severe dam­ cavitation 
plant ' age complete lead to wall 
replacement loss and even­
should be done tual failure 
Discharge Butterfly Control Seawater, Blockage, 29 Pump & system Corrosion/ero­
isolation moving seawater 42000 lea* fail­ failure sion, loss of 
valve flow 87°F ure to open power 
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1. seawater pump, 
2. seawater piping, and 
3. traveling screens. 
4.2.3. Make-up water system 
Untreated seawater is heated and concentrated in a form which 
precipitates as a scale deposit on the evaporator and other equipment. 
These scale deposits act as thermal insulators and reduce the ef­
ficiency of the evaporation process. The three principal types of 
seawater evaporator scale deposits are calcium carbonate (CaCO^), mag­
nesium hydroxide (MgOHg), and calcium sulphate (CaSO^). 
Some of the critical variables influencing the formation of these 
scale deposits are : 
1. maximum brine temperature, 
2. concentration of recycle brine, and 
3. hydrogen ion concentration (pH). 
Generally speaking, the scale control technique which has proven 
most successful is pH control. Since carbonates and hydroxides can be 
decomposed by lowering pH, sulfuric acid is fed to the make-up seawater 
to convert the bicarbonate ions to free carbon dioxide. The acidified 
seawater make-up is then pumped to an atmospheric decarbonator, where 
approximately 90% of the carbon dioxide (CO^) is removed. Table 4.22 
gives the failure rates for each component in this system, it is ap­
parent from this table, that pumps and pipes are the major problem areas 
in the system. Also, poor performance of the decarbonator tower began 
due to an accumulation of sulfur deposits ; then, a new atmospheric de-
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Table 4.22. Make-up water system failure rates 
Event Failure rate x 10 Value Repair Sources 
(per hr) 
Actual industry ^r) 
used, time 
X 10 (hour) 
Decarbonator 
leakage/rupture 26 








Blower motor fails 
to function 44 
Oeaerator fails 
to function 17 




Test and malntenemce 








Operator errors on 
pump — 
Test and maintenance 
errors on pump 62 
Manual valve fails 
to remain open 2 
Pump line down for 
test and maintenance 
25 26 40 [2][10][46] 
8 83 18 [2][10][46] 
68 183 16 [2][10][46] 
1.3 35 3 [45][10][46] 
12 44 24 [2][10][46] 
13 44 10 [45][10][46] 
10 17 40 [2][10][46] 
279 24 [10][46] 
61 20 [10][46] 
17 17 5 [45] 
30 70 20 [45][10][46] 
13 17 10 [45][10][46] 
11 11 5 [45][46] 
6500 6500 5 [45][46] 
17 62 5 [45][46] 
4 2 18 [2][10][46] 
3333 3333 48 [45][46) 
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Table 4.22. (continued) 
Event Failure rate x 10~^ Value Repair Sources 
(per hr) used_^ time 
Actual industry 
Operator errors 
on MOV — 6500 6500 5 [45] 
Mechanical failure 
of deaerator pump 65 276 65 20 [2] [10] [46] 
carbonator was installed to improve the treatment of the make-up feed. 
Carbon steel components in the decarbonator, such as blowers, 
brackets, screens, etc., have suffered severe corrosion. The corrosion 
occurring inside the plant equipment is due to the presence of oxygen 
in the make up seawater. To achieve a complete oxygen removal and to 
remove noncondensable gases, vacuum deaerators have been utilized. 
But the integral last stage deaerators have not worked well. Fiber 
glass distributors and gratings are working satisfactorily. 
The failure modes for most of the make up water system are corro­
sion, erosion and acid attacks as illustrated in Table 4.23. Failures 
of decarbonator blowers, flow control valves, and pumps are the dominant 
component failures in this system. And to improve the availability of 
this system, these components should be improved by some modification 
and selection of reliable materials. 
4.2.4. Brine recycle system 
The brine heater shells are faibricated from carbon steel and have 
worked well. Deaeratçd recycle brine lines in service above ISO^F 
are made from carbon steel lined with Cu-Ni and have worked well. The 
Table 4.23. Failure modes and effect analysis of make-up seawater system 
Component Type Function Environment Failure Failure Effect on Cause 
rate X 10-^ > system 
(per hr) 
Decarbon- Vertical To pump Seawater Pump end 70 Pump & system Corrosion/ 
ator centrifugal the make­ (99°P, failure. failure erosion, for­
pumps up water 37°C) casing im­ eign matter 
through the peller. and salt de­
decarbon- bearing & posits, wear 
ator shaft fail­ 6 lube defi­






Decarbon- Rectangular To remove Seawater Poor per­ 26 System failure Corrosion, 
ator vessel C<? (W°F, formance 6 plant must salt deposit 
tower 37®C) shut down 
Decarbon- Direct To blow air Poor per­ 44 System failure High current, 
ator drive axial into fan de formance corrosiMi 
blower flow carbonator 
Deaerator Horizontal Furnishes Make-up Same as 65 Pump 6 system Same as above 
pumps centrifugal make-up water (99 above failure 
water to F, 37°C) 
the (pH 6-6.5) 
deaerator 
Table 4.23. (continued) 




Piping C.S, Conveys Dearated & Leak/ 

















water flow 37®C) 
rate 
(99°F, 
Plugging, 83 System failure 




lines for service below ISO^F are fabricated from carbon steel and 
leak frequently. 
The materials for construction of recycle pumps are presented in 
Table 4.9. The recycle pumps suffered from material misapplications 
and high concentrations of silt and organic materials in the seawater. 
The inherent tendency of the low ductility Ni-Resist cast impellers 
toward residual stress cracking resulted in excessive maintenance. 
Also, the brine recycle pumps shaft sleeves of stainless steel failed 
occasionally. 
The brine heater overall heat transfer coefficient is approximately 
500 Btu/hr-ft^ cc»npared to a design value of 600 Btu/hr-ft^ °F [13]. 
Hie lower overall heat transfer coefficients in the brine heater were 
due to sulfate scale in the brine heater. 
Condensate pump shafts failed occasionally. Suction pipes and Ni-
Resist experienced cracking. Acupro-nlckel 90-10 stood up well in the 
brine heater, but failed occasionally. 
Table 4.24 presents the failure rates for each component of the 
recycle brine system in a MSF desalination plant. We can see that 
both recycle and condensate pumps have the highest failure rate. Also, 
tubes in the brine heater have high failure rates. 
Table 4.24. Brine recycle system failure rates 
Event Failure rate x 10~^ Value Repair Sources 
(per hr) used , time 
Actual industry 
Mechanical failure 
of BR pump 222 78 222 20 [2][10][46] 
MOV fails to function 78 17 78 18 [2][10][46] 
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Table 4.24. (continued) 









Actual Industry (hour) 
BH tube leakage 479 — 479 16 [10][46] 
Mechanical failure of 
condensate pump 135 50 135 20 [10][46][2] 
Motor fails to 
function 78 13 78 10 [45][10][46] 
Poor control of 
desuperheater 17 mam» 17 15 [10][46] 
Pipe leakage/ 
rupture 52 68 52 16 [2][10][46] 
Circuit breaker short 17 11 17 5 [45]110][46] 
Pump valve fails to 
remain open 9 4 9 18 [2][10][46] 
Test and maintenance 
errors on pump 62 17 52 5 [45][46][10] 
Test and mad.ntenauice 
errors on valve 17 17 17 5 [45][2] 
BH hot well leakage/ 
rupture 17 38 17 16 [2][10][46] 
Operator errors on 
pump — 6500 5500 5 [45] 
C^>erator errors on 
MOV • 6500 6500 5 [45] 
Pump line down for 
test and mainte­
nance 3333 48 [45][46] 
Conductivity 
indicator failure — 6 6 5 [2] 
Temperature 
indicator failure — 6 6 5 [2] 
The failure modes amd effect analysis of the brine recycle system 
are given in Table 4.25, where the failure nodes for most of these com­
ponents are corrosion, erosion, and scale formation, or a combination of 
Table 4.25. Failure modes and effect analysis of brine recycle system 
Component Type Function Environment Failure Failure , Effect on Cause 
modes rate x 10 system 
(per hr) 
Recycle Vertical Furnishes Brine con­ Casing, 222 Pump and Corrosion and 
pwnps 1/2 plant centrated bearing system erosion, for­
brine re­ (100°F) shaft. failure eign matter. 















ture, lube oil 
deficiency 
end failure 
Brine C.S. 90- Heats sea- Brine con­ Leaks, 479 Plant shutdown Corrosion, 
heater 10 Cu-4)i water centrated plugging. erosion, for­
tubes (250°F) rupture eign matter 
lodged, 
cavitation 
lead to wall 
loss amd even­
tual failure 
Tempera­ Globe Maintains Steauu Leaks, 78 System failure Corrosion and 
ture (MOV) a pre­ (336°P) blockage erosion 






Table 4.25. (continued) 
Competent Type Function Environment Failure Failure_^ Effect on Cause 
modes ratex 10 system 
(per hr) 
Flow Butterfly Controls Heated con- leaks. 78 System failure Corrosion and 
control (MOV) brine flow centrated plugging erosion 
valve into first brine and 
stage (250°F) rupture 
flash 
chamber 
Condensate Centrifugal Pumps con- Condensate Casing, 135 System failure Corrosion and 
pumps densate (265®F) bearing. erosion, wear. 
from hot shaft, pack­ lube oil 
trell and ing gland deficiency 
returns to and motor 
boiler failure, im­





Piping C.S. Conveys Dearated Leaks and 52 Leaks and even­ Corrosion, 
30" dearated seawater ruptures tual failure pitting, ero­
seawater (100- requiring sion, and 
from brine 250°?) patching or if cultivation 
recycle severe damage lead to wall 
pumps to occurs complete loss and even­
waterboxes replacement. tual failure 
of condens­ Plant must be 
ing surfaces shut down to 
and to brine effect repairs. 
heater 
Table 4.25. (continued) 
Component Type Function Environment Paiilure Failure_^ Effect on Cause 
modes rate x 10 system 
(per hr) 
Level Globe Ccmtrols Condensate 
control (MOV) condensate water 
valve level in (265°F) 
the hot 
well 





all three. Chemical conditions of brine and temperature fluctuation 
are the main causes of scale formation. From Table 4.25, we can point 
out the critical components «rtiich need improvements. The pumps and 
« 
tubes in the brine heater are the major sources of problems in this system. 
Estimation of systems failure rates and repair times are given in 
Table 4.26. These values are a good approximation and have been 
calculated from the operational data of the present MSP plant. The 
Table 4.26. Desalination plant systems failure rates 









Actual Industry (hour) 
Distillate system 
unavailable 326 333 326 20 [2][10] 
Vacuum system 
unavailable 279 279 24 [10][46] 
Slowdown system 
unavailable 298 370 298 20 [2][10] 
Lack of steam — 1000 1000 20 [1][10] 
External caused 
failure 52 52 20 [5][10] 
Loss of power 857 1000 857 10 [5][10] 
Evaporator modules 
unavailable 388 — 388 24 [10][46j 
table shows that loss of power and lack of steam are the major con­
tributors to plant unavailability. The reliability improvement of 
both the steam generation system and the power plant would increase 
the availability of the desalination plants. 
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4.2.5. Scale formation and corrosion 
An examination of heat exchanger deposits from MSF plants work­
ing at maximum brine temperatures between 90°C (194^F) and 120^C 
(248°F) reveals three commonly occurring constituentsi calcium car­
bonate, magnesium hydroxide, and calcium sulphate. 
Seawater is usually saturated with calcium bicarbonate, as shown 
in Table 4.27. As seawater is heated, the calcium bicarbonate is 
decomposed to calcium carbonate, water, and caurbon dioxide. This de­
composition is essentially complete at 77°c (170^F). Since the 
solubility of calcium carbonate in water decreases with increasing 
temperature, and since the saturation point of 120 ppn calcium car­
bonate is about 170°F, scale will form on heat transfer surfaces at 
higher temperatures [16]. The preferential, scale formation is in the 
brine heater and in the evaporator modules (the highest heat input 
area of the plant). 
Table 4.27. Water analysis for Jeddah I desalination plant 





































To give some idea of the scaling potential, it can be shown that 
a one million gallon per day output plant working under normal con­
centration conditions could precipitate a theoretical of about 
1400 Kg of CaCOg or 800 Kg Mg(OH)g each day, and this may represent a 
thickness of up to 0.1 mm on the total heat exchanger surface within a 
typical plant [14]. Scale deposits usually affect operations in two 
ways* 
1. Reduction of effective flow area and, therefore, reduced 
capacity, and 
2. impairment of heat transfer and, therefore, reduced 
capacity. 
The corrosion rates of carbon steel at different concentrations 
and flow rates are calculated as shown in Tables 4.28, 4.29, and 4.30. 
The average flow rate in the brine heater for the Jeddah I Desalination 
2 
Plant is about 153 cm /sec. 113], so Table 4.29 shows that at normal 
operational conditions, the brine heater corrosion rate is approxi­
mately one (^). 
Table 4.28. Calculated corrosion rates (—) on carbon steel in 
deaerated 
Flow rate = 112 cm/sec 
Temperature Oxygen IPPb) 
°c 10 50 100 200 
20 0.068 0.34 0.68 1.36 
40 0.12 0.6 1.2 2.4 
60 0.18 0.9 1.8 3.6 
80 0.28 1.4 2.8 5.6 
100 0.4 2.0 4 8 
120 0.6 3.0 6 12 
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Table 4.29. Calculated corrosion rates (^) on carbon steel in 
deaerated seawater ^ 
Flow rate = 153 cm/sec 
Temperature Oxygen (PPb) 
°C 10 50 100 200 
20 0.089 0.44 0.89 1.78 
40 0.15 0.77 1.54 3.08 
60 0.24 1.2 2.4 4.8 
80 0.37 1.85 3.7 7.4 
100 0.54 2.7 5.4 10.8 
120 0.79 3.94 7.88 15.76 
Table 4.30. Calculated corrosion rates (—) on carbon steel in 
deaerated seawater 
Flow rate = 213 cm/sec . 
Temperature Oxygen (PPb) 
"c 10 50 100 200 
20 0.12 0.6 1.2 2.4 
40 0.21 1.05 2.1 4.2 
60 0.32 1.6 3.2 6.4 
80 0.5 2.5 5 10 
100 0.72 3.6 7.2 14.4 
120 1.06 5.3 10.6 21.2 
4.2.6. Scale control 
Scale control is achieved by one of two methodsi acid treatment, 
or the use of additives, such as polyphosphate. Acid treatment involves 
the pretreatment of brine with sufficient acid to decompose practically 
all of the bicarbonate ion formed by a degassing process to eliminate CO^. 
Ttie use of acid is a very effective means of preventing alkaline 
scales in all MSF plants. The acid injected into the seawater make-up 
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stream destroys and breaks most of the bicarbonates» thus preventing 
alkaline scales from forming. Unfortunately, the addition of acid 
requires precise injection rate control and proper instrumentation for 
pH control. Most of the desalting plant operating problems reported 
are due to improper operating conditions. Since the rate of acid is 
controlled by pH, this process requires essentially complete degasifl-
catlon, dearatlon, amd accurate pH monitoring and control; all of which 
require periodic maintenance. A water analysis laboratory is also 
essential to check pH instrumentation calibration, dissolved oxygen 
levels, and residual carbonate levels in the make up and recycle 
streams. 
Itie consequences of over or under acidification are of great risk 
to the long term operation of the plant, even if done only over short 
operation cycles. 
4.2.7. Consideration of nuclear desalination plants 
Failure rates have been calculated for components of commercial 
nuclear power plants using LWR technology. Operation experience has 
shown frequent pump failure, but to a lesser extent than commercial 
desalination pleuits, due to the standards and codes used in selection 
of pumps for nuclear systems. Other failure-prone equipment Includes 
valves. There is no doubt that if nucleaur standards are used in de­
salination plants, fewer failures will occur. However, the cost may 
not justify the benefit gained. 
Corrosion could affect nuclear systems drastically, since it causes 
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changes in reactivity and core dynamics. Precautions against leaks of 
corrosive brine or acid from the MSF plant should be made to avoid 
enhancement of corrosion in the nuclear steam supply system. 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS PGR IMPROVEMENT OF MSF PLANTS 
FOR USE WITH NUCI£AR POWER 
Pump experience with MSF desalting plants indicates the need for 
improvement in design and in the selection of materials for pumps in all 
seawater applications. By far the most problematic is the recycle pump, 
which is required to deliver large quantities of liquid under very un­
favorable suction conditions. The approach to pump design, manufacture, 
erection, maintenance, and control should be such as to permit failure-
free operation during the total time that the equipment is required to 
be in service. 
Pump failures can be categorized into those vriiich require a complete 
dismantling and paurts replacement and those which can be corrected with­
out dismantling. Extended usage of pumping equipment causes some of 
the components to wear. Failures requiring pump dismantling should be 
completely eliminated by a combination of proper design, manufacturer's 
testing, erection, and balancing; otherwise, pump avaU.lability will drop 
very rapidly, as it may take more than two weeks to dismantle and re­
assemble one of the pumps. 
During the planned annual shutdown, each pump should be overhauled. 
During this period, all maintenance work items should be carried out, 
clearance taken, worn parts replaced, euid motor-pump balancing checked. 
Three 50% capacity recycle pumps should be provided for each unit, 
thereby, providing an installed spare. 
Failure of the make-up pumps will reduce the heat rejection capacity 
of the desalting plant. Lowering the brine heater outlet temperature 
and possibly some throttling in the recycle stream, will permit contin­
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uous operation at reduced capacity. The make-up pump failure will have 
some effect on the desalting operating factor and, therefore, one 
installed spare make-up pump should be provided. Under the conditions 
discussed above, the pumps and their drives can be expected to yield 
high availability values. Spare pumps should permit continuous full 
capacity operation of the desalting plant in the event that there is 
a pump failure. 
5.1. Seawater Intake System 
Ttie seawater intake and strainer system is an area trtiere corrosion 
problems may aiffect the total plant operation. Therefore, the water 
intake system has to be designed with due care to cater to all condi­
tions of operation and stoppage, and also prevention of carry-over of 
materials, like seaweed and samd, which may affect the operation of the 
plant. Cast iron, the usual material of construction of bar and fram 
screens, is unsuitable. In many cases, sulphate reducing bacteria are 
present, and their activity, together with the hydrogen sulphide^ 
then induce failure of cast iron components. However, it is also of 
great importance to ensure that the drive mechanism is manufactured in 
corrosion resistant materials. Corrosion of the drive mechamism is 
one of the major causes of failure in seawater screening systems. There­
fore, it is necessary to take in water from a distance of at least 700 
meters from the sea. The pipes should be of suitable material and they 
should be designed to withstamd all hydrostatic and dynamic pressures, 
water hammer, and ground water pressure. 
Necessary modifications in the actual seawater intake design should 
104 
be done in order to prevent the occurrence of such troubles. 
5.2. Materials of Construction 
A plant's available and on stream performance records depend on 
the ability of all components to continuously perform their required 
function, although many operation problems show that corrosion of com­
ponents is a major handicap. Premature failures of waterboxes, control 
valves, piping, vacuum systems, and condensers are typical of desalting 
plants. 
Water boxes, interconnecting pipework, and ducts in unprotected 
carbon steel are a source of trouble. In practice, premature failure 
of unprotected carbon steel waterboxes occurs rapidly in both high 
and low temperature sections. Cupro-nickel lining for all waterboxes 
is advised; otherwise, cupro-nickel waterboxes are recommended. The 
cupro-nickel alloy is adequate for the brine ducts and the inter­
connecting pipetrork systems. 
5.3. Evaporator Tubes and Plates 
It is important to consider each section of the evaporator sepa­
rately. The varied conditions in each section of the evaporator portion 
require different approaches. The materials of tube plate should compete 
with the material of the tube used, such eis, 90/10 cupro-nickel tubes 
plates can be used with 90/10 cupro-nickle tubes. Experience of the 
evaporator tubes in the heat recovery section indicates that 90/10 
cupro-nickel tubes aure suitable, but have a limited life in this environ­
ment. The heat rejection section tubes experience indicates that under 
the Red Sea conditions the most suitable alloy to use in this service 
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is the 70/30 cupro-nickel tubes. The brine heater tubes operate at the 
highest temperature. Consequently, the tubes are exposed to the great­
est scale formation and the most corrosive conditions. Experience in­
dicates that the useful life of 90/10 cupro-nickel tubes does not 
exceed five years, so it is advisable to use either titanium tubes or 
70/30 cupro-nickel alloy. The expected service life of these tubes 
is ten years or longer. Experience in the use of unprotected carbon 
steel for the evaporator shell and flash stages indicated a major 
corrosion problen, so vessels should be clad or lined with cupro-
nickel. When lining, care must be teJcen to ensure that the lining 
is adequately fastened to the walls of the vessels. Ejector conden- • 
ser system experience shows that all cupro-nickeIs fail within a 
short period. So only titanium tubes are a possible alternative. 
Tube plate and condenser shell materials of construction should 
be titanium. Carbon steel components, such as, blowers, brackets, 
screens, gratings, etc., have suffered severe corrosion, so FRP is the 
recommended material for such items in the decarbonators and the 
deaerators. 
5.4. Design and Performance Dnprovements 
The following recommendations are based on experience and are 
intended to mitigate operation and design problems, auid to improve the 
performance of the MSF desalination plants to enhance the reliability 
of the desalting stage and eliminate potential disturbances to the 
nuclear power generating units. 
1, Design and construction of a desalting plant should be governed 
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by strict technical amd performance specifications using 
quality control to assure meeting those specifications. The 
operation data analyzed In section 4.1. reflect the necessity 
of this consideration. 
The desalting equipment specified should be of a simple, 
well-tested, commercially-proven design. 
Extreme care should be exercised In the selection of the source 
of seawater supply and the design of the seawater supply system. 
Since the analysis of this system showed that screen failures 
and blockage of seawater Intake were the major contributors, 
the system has an unavailability of 0.069 (see Section 6.9,). 
Extreme care should be exercised In the design of the system 
to monitor and control the chemistry of the process streams. 
The brine recycle system and the make up water system are suf­
fering from improper operation conditions and low availability 
factors (see Section 6.9.). 
The use of uncoated or unllned carbon steel should be avoided, 
unless continuous and complete corrosion control can be main­
tained. The evaporators experienced corrosion and scale forma­
tion, which have contributed to the low performance amd low pro­
duction rate of the total plant (see Section 4.1.). 
Corrosion monitoring should be practiced continuously by dally 
checks of metallic ions in the process streams. Also, yearly 
measurements should be made of tube wall thickness. The make­
up water system is found to have unavailability of 0.034, and 
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the low quality of this feed Is due to the malfunction of 
the decarbonator, the deaerator, and the Incorrect acid In­
jection to the streams (see Sections 4.2. and 6.7.). 
7. The staff for operating and maintaining the desalting facility 
must be fully experienced and qualified. New personnel must 
go through a training program, 
8. Desalting plants should be operated continuously as much as 
possible, to minimize corrosion due to air infiltration during 
shutdowns. 
9. A maintenance program should be Included in the initial plan­
ning stage and adhered to during operation. 
10. Since plant maintenance shutdowns are required, system planning 
should Include provision for storage and enough capacl^ margin 
so that the plant can be allowed to go "off stream" for regu­
larly scheduled routine maintenance. 
11. Operators should keep adequate records and follow prescribed 
preventative maintenance programs. The present reports of 
operation and ffled.ntenance are not giving enough information on 
events amd failures. Also, the preventive maintenance programs 
need to be implemented. To illustrate this pointt the sea-
water Intake well caused the Reverse Osmosis plant to shutdown, 
due to the accumulation of debris on the screens (see Section 
7.5.). 
12. A formal reliability and maintainability program should be 
established to provide technical support on the development of 
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specifications, policy documents and standards, perform de­
sign reviews, and to operate an information system for col­
lecting reliability and maintainability data. 
The above recommendations entail placing emphasis on 
1. Selection of material, 
2. Increase in the level of plamt monitoring, and 
3. improvement in plant operation and maintenance. 
"Mie state-of-the-art of the MSP technology has greatly progressed since 
the construction of Jeddah I, as can be seen from the improvements intro­
duced in the last decade on that plant. The use of nuclear power to 
supply heat to an MSP plant would require 
1. An integral single control unit for power and desalting, 
2. A coordinated maintenance program for water and power 
production, 
3. A reliable quality assurance program, 
4. An increased effort on design of the instrumentation euid 
control system, and 
5. A higher level of training for operators amd testing and 
maintenance personnel. 
These requirements will alleviate the consequences of many of the 
existing problems. 
The coupling of the MSF process with the nuclear power system via 
the back pressure turbine will be adequate in the case of Saudi Arabia, 
since water is always in high demand. Excess water produced can be 
stored for replenishing the supply during plant shutdown. 
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6. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS OP MSF PLANTS 
6.1, Fault Tree Process 
Using detailed plant design information on the MSF dealination 
plant, fault trees were synthesized to determine how the system could 
fall in terms of faults of the basic constituents of the system. Faults 
postulated included consideration of failure modes of pipes, valves, 
pumps and electric power. In addition to the component failure modes, 
humam errors which could result in "faulted" components were also con­
sidered . 
A MSF desalination plant is composed of many components and the 
relationship between individual component availability and systems 
availability is not a simple functional relationship. Quantitative anal­
ysis of system unavailability and its root causes is normally accomplished 
using fault trees. 
Fault trees have been used more connonly in saifety analysis [45], 
Itie output of a fault tree analysis is the probability of occurrence 
of the undesired (top) event. Figure 6.1 shows a breakdown of the fault 
tree identification code v^ich has been used for listing of failures 
on the tree, and Table 6.1 gives the relevant codes. 
The fault tree euialysis staurted with the top event "desalination 
plant unavailable to produce sufficient distillate." This top event 
is a very important event, since many types of failure modes are in­
volved euid this event can occur frequently and lead to unreliable pleuit 
operation through loss of water production. Also, the analysis of this 
fault tree illustrates potential failure problems and shows the critical 
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Figure 6,1, Breakdown of fault event code 
Ill 
TeU>le 6.1. Fault event codes 
Code System Code Component Code Failure type 
A Seawater intake PP Pipe A Short circuit 
B Make-up water TK Tank B Poor vacuum 
C Brine recycle PH Pump D Loss of steam 
D Distillate TG Tube E Plugged 
E Electric CV Check valve F Leakage/rupture 
F Slowdown XV Control valve G Test 6 mainte­
G Vacuum MV Motor operated nance outage 
H Evaporator valve I Incorrect dosing 
I Steam PV Manual valve K Contamination of 
J Sulfuric acid NZ Nozzle seawater 
MO Motor L Loss of power 
SC Screen N Environmental 
BH Brine heater cause 





Q Does not remain 
open 
MD Module u Unavailable 
PS Pressure sensor H Loss of function 
DE Deaerator X Maintenance 
BL Blower fault 
TV Temperature control 
valve 
Y Operator error 
TI Temperature 
indicator 
components, vrtilch would impact plant availability. Failure of a desali­
nation plant to produce sufficient distillate is assessed, using fault 
tree logic as shown in Figure 6.2. The comnon contributors of plant 
outage are illustrated in the fault tree diagram, where loss of power 
and lack of steam had a great impact on plant outage. Loss of power is 
frequent, and caused many disturbances to all systems. The faults have 
been developed in detail for the following systemst 
1. seawater intake sysiiem, 
2. make-up water system, and 
3. brine recycle system, 
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Figure 6,2. (continued) 
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Since these systems are the most important systems and they represent 
the major problem areas in MSP plant. The fault tree was then devel­
oped by working back through the MSP desalination plant from the 
headers, %rtiich deliver the distillate to a water distribution system. 
By utilizing appropriate "gates" and "houses" in constructing 
the tree, those changes in the system configuration that occur were 
identified. Paults at the interfaces with other systems were included 
in the MSP desalination plant analysis. Following the construction of 
the fault tree process, a quantitative evaluation was performed to 
assess the probability of failure of the MSP desalination plant. 
6,2. Initial Assumptions 
Ihe fault tree analysis and evaluation of the MSP desalination 
plant proceeded, based on the following assumptions * 
1. Loss of power affects both units. 
2. Any failure identified on the fault tree was assumed to be 
of sufficient magnitude to constitute component failure. 
Por example, pump failure, as it applies on the tree, re­
sults in sufficiently reduced flow to make the pump essen­
tially unavailable. 
3. All small pipes (1" diameter or less) were considered suf­
ficiently small that their rupture would not result in 
sufficient fluid loss to cause system failure. 
4. Any monitors associated with valve position, pump flow, etc., 
are operable and provide adequate information for am operator 
to respond. 
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5. Piping failures resulting in a total catastrophic break are 
rare occurrences. Rather more likely is a significant leak 
requiring repair or a leak in a sensitive location. 
6. Human fetilures include miscalibration and failure to remove 
the system from isolation after maintenance. 
7. Loss of power and external causes are included but there is 
no development of these events in the fault trees. 
8. Steam is provided by heat recovery from the power generation 
unit or from the boiler directly. 
6.3. Results of Analysis of System Interfaces 
The MSP desalination plant consists of two units. Each unit is 
identical to the other. Both units interface with the circulating 
seawater system, water distribution systam, and electric power. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the interfaces between all systems in the MSP 
desalination plant. The results of the system interface analysis 
showed thatI 
1. The seawater intake system and the evaporators interface at 
the inlet header of the evaporator. Faults in the seawater 
intake system should not affect the evaporator because the 
check valve would prevent flow to the evaporator. 
2. The make-up water system interfaces with the evaporator at 
two locations, the first one at the inlet of the heat rejection 
section of the evaporator and the second one at the outlet 
frcm the deaerator. Also, it interfaces with the vacuum 
system at the vent condenser. Faults in the vacuum system 
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would affect this system. In fact, faults in the make-up 
system can affect the evaporator; therefore, the faults are 
reflected in the fault trees. 
3. The brine recycle system interfaces with the evaporator at 
stage 42 outlet. Faults in the evaporator would affect the 
brine recycle system; therefore, the faults are reflected 
in the fault tree for this system. 
6,4. Initial Examination of Potential Faults 
During the development of the fault trees,a number of potential 
faults were studied to determine whether they could be excluded from 
the trees, either because their contribution to unavailability was 
clearly dominated by other failures or because such faults do not 
directly contribute to system failure as defined in the statement of 
the top event. Examples are: 
1. Chemical shortages were considered xaxe, since plant reports 
showed no such event occurring in the history of the plant. 
2. Because of the time available to start the systems and the 
capability to initiate the systems manually, those portions 
of the pump control circuits which start the pumps do not 
appeaur on the fault trees. 
6.5. Quantification of the Fault Trees 
Tables 4.2, 4.22, 4.24, and 4.26 list all the failures shown on the 
fault trees. Failure rates, fault repair times,and source of data for 
all events are also shown. All equipment and human error failure rates 
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were calculated from the actual operating data, or taken from some 
industrial sources [2, 5, 45, 46, 10[. 
These fault trees require the use of automated logic evaluation 
procedures (FREP-KITT codes) [47], such that information on equipment 
reliability, availability, and point estimates of unit unavailability 
can be evaluated quickly and accurately. 
Hardware contribution to systems unavailability results entirely 
from potential single component faults which could cause system failure, 
or from double component faults such as pumps failure. 
The construction of the fault trees included common mode failure. 
The failure causes modeled in the fault trees included not only hard­
ware failure, but also failures caused by human intervention, (that is, 
test and maintenance acts) which enabled potential dependencies to be 
investigated and incorporated in the quantification. To illustrate for 
the effects of this more complete failure cause identification, in a 
number of the fault trees constructed, a valve normally open being in 
a closed position was determined to be a failure. The failure could 
be caused by the valve itself falling closed while it should be open 
(a hardware failure). The valve could also be in a closed position 
due to its being purposely closed to perform testing or maintenance, 
or due to the operator's forgetting to open it after the test or 
maintenance act. 
6.6. Fault Tree Analysis of the Seawater Intake System 
The fault tree is illustrated in Figure 6.3. The tree was con­
structed by tracing though system operations and identifying possible 
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single and multiple modes of equipment failure. Prom Table 4.20, pump 
failures have a great potential contribution of system unavailability, 
and the fault tree diagram shows that failure of two circulating sea-
water pumps will lead to insufficient production of distillate, and 
hence, low performance of the plant. Ite seawater intake structure 
provides a major source for plant unavailability, due to improper design 
and inadequate maintenance program. The degradation of a system's 
equipment has caused the system to fail frequently. 
Insufficient redundancy of components has caused the system to 
fail and made the repairs and maintenance very difficult and should 
take the system off-line for a long time. Frequent malfunction of 
instruments in this system have led to component failure. Test and 
maintenance acts on pumps have been a major contributor to system 
unavailability, as shown in Table 4.20. 
6.7. Fault Tree Analysis of Make-Up Water System 
The fault tree diagram is shown in Figure 6.5, where the most 
important events are included. 
From this fault tree, the following components fed.lures have a 
potential contribution on system unavailability; hence, to plant 
reliability: 
1. spray nozzles in both decarbonator and deaerator plugging, 
2. level control valve (LCV-8) failure, 
3. decarbonator pumps malfunction, and 
4. flow control valve (FCV-6). 
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Figure 6.5. Fault tree diagram of make-up water system 
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Figure 6.6. MSP, make-up water system flow diagram 
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the system caused many types of failure modes to occur frequently. 
Instrument failure and Insufficient Inspection have led equipment 
to malfunction, and cause corrosion and scale formation of different 
parts of the system. Acid attack on components was another source 
of the system's unavailability. Table 4,22 shows the failure rates 
and repair times for all unavailability contributors in the system. 
Pumps and maintenance are the major contributors of system failure. 
6.8. Fault Tree Analysis of the Brine Recycle System 
Figure 6.7 shows the fault tree diagram for the brine recycle system. 
The following events and components failures are identified: 
1. Brine heater tubes damage or leaks, 
2. Brine recycle pumps failure, 
3. Flow control valve (FCV) prevents flow, and 
4. Temperature control valve failure (TCV-1). 
Diverse operating conditions of the system contributed to system 
failure, and hence, to plant shutdown. 
Pumps gure the main source of system problems, due to several factors, 
such as design, malntenamce, and operation. The system has no redun­
dancy in some significant part, and materials of construction suffer 
severe corrosion emd scale formation. The heat transfer areas are the 
major source of unavailability in the system. Table 4.24 lists all con­
tributors of failure to the system and the failure rates and repair times 
to each contributor. Pumps and tubes represent the most frequent cause 
of system unavailability. 
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Figure 6,7, Brine recycle system fault tree diagram 
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Figure 6.8, MSP, recirculation brine systan flow diagram 
145 
6.9. Overall Results of the Jeddah I MSF Plant 
It is of interest to estimate the unavailability and the unreli­
ability for the MSF desalination plant at Jeddah from the actual op­
erating data, in order to focus on reported problems and the total 
spectrum of plant operation criteria. Table 6.2 illustrates the major 
sources of unavailability for a typical desalination plant, and the 
specific unavailability of these systems. 
using the actual operating data, a quantification of unavailability 
contributors is given in Table 6.3 for the MSF plant. 
In Figures 6.9-6.12, the estimates of unavailability for the systems 
and the plants are shown. Also^in Figures 6.13-6.16, the estimates of 
the probability of one or more failure to time t are shown. 
From the previous analysis and experience with field data, the 
following conclusions are sumnarized. 
1. Poor operating conditions are the main cause of troubles 
in all systems. 
2. One of the main reasons for the corrosion problems encountered 
has been the many startup and shutdown cycles. 
3. The production rate and thermal performance of all the de­
salting plants studied have not met the design requirements 
during commercial operation. 
4. Most of the operator's time is spent in attempting to keep the 
plants producing water, and no time is spent reviewing operating 
data and analyzing problems which decrease the plant's reli­
ability and service life. 
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Table 6.2. MSF systems characteristics resulted from KITT code run 
System fiS 10-3 10*^ (hr"^) c -3 F sum X 10 
Seawater intake 68.9 140 280 
Make-iip water 33.6 44.3 75 
Brine recycle 209.6 290 460 
Vacuum 8.8 2.8 6.7 
Slowdown 7.4 3 7.1 
Distillate 8.1 3.3 7.8 
Evaporator 4.65 3.9 9.3 
Acid 1.2 6.1 1.5 
Plant 356.3 724.4 762.3 
/ = the component failed probability. 
= the component failure intensity. 
°F sum = the probability of one or more failure to time t. 
Table 6.3. MSF plant unavailability contributors characteristics 
resulted from KITT code run 
Outage Contributor Q X lO'S L X lGr*(hr-l) F sun X 10"3 
Circulating water pumps 5.77 2.9 6.9 
Operator errors 31.5 65 144 
Seawater screens 4.85 0.87 2.1 
Pipe 2.9 1.8 4.4 
Motor operated valves (MU) 1.5 0.83 1.2 
Decarbonator pumps 1.4 0.7 1.7 
Motor operated valves (BR) 1.4 0.78 1.8 
Tubes 7.6 4.8 11.4 
Recycle pumps 4.4 2.2 5.3 
Condensate pumps 6.4 1.35 3.2 
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5. Some needed modifications and improvements in the plant have 
been postponed until the plant's performance declined far 
below the original capabilities. 
6. Poor maintenance of the plant's equipment is due to the in­
sufficient experience of the operation-maintenance staff. 
7. Lack of spare parts in the plant contributed to plant un­
availability. 
8. Demisters and waterboxes or their covers should be designed 
for^easy removal, to facilitate tube cleaning and inspection. 
9. Most of the instruments and controls of MSP desalting plant 
have problems. 
10. Failure of automatic controls is increasing, and is due to 
lack of simple maintenance and daily testing. 
11. Tools and equipment needed to perform repairs and maintenauice 
are often unavailable or unreliable. 
12. A computer progreun should be used to determine the outage 
dates for each item in the plant to be overhauled. Such a 
program would make possible the rapid calculation necessary 
to optimize plant outage, to ensure minimum cost to the system. 
In fact, recent operating experience reports of both MSP and RO 
plants reveal that these water desalting plamts operate substantially 
different from the way they were designed to operate. The reports also 
show that these plants are plagued with a greater number of shutdowns 
and plant maintenance needs. In summary, these plants have not been able 
either to produce the amount of pure water at their expected cost, or to 
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7. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF REVERSE OSMOSIS PLANT 
7.1. Introduction 
The increasing complexity of desalting plants demands consider­
ation of operational and maintenance factors in the design phase. This 
report illustrates the applications of fault tree techniques to desali­
nation systems. In this paper, critical problem areas have been 
identified euid methods of improving the performance of desalination 
plants are recommended. Failure data have been extracted from operation 
and maintenance reports of operating desalination plants at Saudi 
Arabia. 
An assessment is made of the impact of failures and outages on the 
availability of the RO desalination plamt. The design configuration 
of the i desalination plant and maintenance practices are found to have 
an impact on the acceptability of water supply quality and reliability. 
7.2. Plant Description 
The plant is composed of the following system:» as shown in Figure 
7.1. 
7.2.1. Seawater intake system 
To supply the plant with screened seawater, seawater flows to the 
seawater pumpwell, where a cleanable screen and trash rake in the well 
prevent trash or fish from entering the seawater supply pumps. 
7.2.2. Pretreatment system 
The system consists of alum feed, dual media filters, clearwell, 
sulfuric acid addition, phosphate addition, and cartridge filters. 
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Figure 7,1, Block diagram of the four major systems 
1, Seawater intake 
2. Pretreatment 
3, R.O. 
4. Post treatment 
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Acid is injected into each stream to adjust the pH value of the 
feedwater. Phosphate is injected to inhibit scale formation. After 
chemical treatment, each stream is filtered to promote chemical mixing 
and to remove suspended solids. 
7.2.3. Reverse osmosis system 
This system consists of two stages. The first stage is composed 
of nine units, while the second-stage is composed of three units. Each 
unit in the first-stage uses two parallel operating diesel engines 
and high pressure pumps, while each second-stage unit receives its 
pressurized feedwater from single high pressure feed pumps. 
7.2.4. Post-treatment system 
This system includes lime treatment, chlorine treatment, and a 
water distribution system. 
Lime is added to stabilize and raise the pH of the product water. 
Chlorine is added to sterilize the product water. 
7.3. Operational Experience 
Based on the actual operating experience of reverse osmosis plant, 
the data are extracted through a review of maintenance and operation 
reports from Jeddah plant from February of 1979 to October of 1980. 
Components failure rates are calculated to determine the significance 
of various types of failures, and to identify the major contributors 
of unavailability. 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) [1] is used in this study to identify 
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the reliability and availability of RO systems. Maintenance and 
operation reports of the RO plant at Jeddah [2-4] are one of the 
tools used to amalyze the reliability of the RO plant. These reports 
contain general information and a brief summary on the type of main­
tenance and repairs performed. However, these reports include limited 
information. 
A variety of start up problems are encountered and various tech­
niques are employed to cope with these problems [48]. Hie plant 
shutdown is frequently due to the followingt 
1. Modifications in the acid injection system and jockey pump 
piping section, 
2. Failure of the fiberglast; supports on unit F, 
3. Fire in the insulation on the generators auid their control 
panel, 
4. Oil spills into the sea, 
5. Electrical fault on the 24 VDC system, and 
6. Underground electrical fault in the pretreatment and sea 
intake areas. 
7.4. Seawater Intake System 
7,4.1. Description 
Figure 7.2 shows the process flow diagram of the seawater intake 
system. Red Sea water flows by gravity through a 760 ran pipe into a 
deep well. A cleanable screen and trash rake in the well prevent fish 
or trash from entering the seawater supply pumps P-lA, P-lB, P-lC. The 
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Figure 7.2. Seawater intake system process flow diagram 
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following are some notes on the system operations. 
1. Two out of three pumps aure required during normal operation. 
2. Low level in the «mil is indicated by a low level alarm 
(IAL-108) in the control room. Cm the same time the level, 
switch LSL-108 will send a shutdown signal to all the three 
pumps. 
3. Discharge pressure (nominally 25 psi) is indicated by the 
pressure gauges Pl-101, PI-102. 
4. Total discharge flow is indicated by FI-105, frtiich is locally 
mounted but recorded in the control room. 
5. The flow is regulated by the motor-operated valve V-13, %rtiich 
is controlled by a level controller LlC-107, which receives 
its signal from a level indicator in the filtered water clear-
well. 
7.5. Seawater Intake System Performance 
%ilure of this system is intolerable in the operation of reverse 
osmosis plant having no secondary source of seawater. Foreign materials, 
sand, fish, and silt were found in the seawater pumpwell. Table 
7.1 illustrates the components failure where pumps are the major con­
tributor to the system unavaileUbility. Accumulation of debris into the 
pumpwell caused the plant to shut down many times due to low level of 
seawater going into the well. The major causes of pump failure are bear­
ing and gland failure, suction problems or cavitation, diverse operation 
conditions, and maintenance conditions. The major failure modes for 
most pumps are corrosion, erosion, and cavitation. 
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Table 7.1. Seawater Intake system failure rates (RO plant) 
Event No. Failure ratex 10 




Value Repair Sources 
used - time 
X 10 (hour) 
(per hr) 
Seawater 
contamination 3 245 
Pipe leakage/ 
rupture 3 245 
Trash screen 





valve failed 3 245 
Instrumentation 
failure - -
Test and maintenance 
errors on MOV - 17 
Stand by pump 
down for mainte­










failure 6 164 
Test and mainte­
nance errors on 




























































7.6. Fault Tree Analysis of Seawater Intake System 
Hie fault tree is Illustrated in Figure 7.3, where the top event 
"Insufficient Flow to Pretreatment System" is considered and the most 
important events are included. The tree was constructed by tracing 
through system operations and identifying possible single and multiple 
modes of equipment failure. Failure rates and repair times were then 
identified by using the actual operation data, and operation data from 
similar Industries [2-5], as shown in Table 7.1. 
Evaluation of equipment and system reliability and availability 
is calculated by using PREP-KITT [47] codes. The failure causes modeled 
in the fault trees included not only hardware failure, but also fadlures 
caused by human intervention and test and maintenance acts. Figure 
7.4 shows a breakdown of the fault identifier code, which has been 
used for listing of fadlures on the tree, and Table 7.2 gives the 
relevant codes. 
7.7. Results 
Experience to date with the operation of the seawater intake system 
indicates different types of problems encountered with some critical 
components. Table 7.3 presents a list of these components together 
with their unreliability and unavailability values. 
From the table, we can see that the seawater Intake system has an 
unavailability of 0.018, with the major contributors being pump failures 
and valve fadlures. Figure 7.5 shows the estimate of unavailability of 
the seawater Intake system. The estimates of the probability of one 
or more failure to time t are shewn in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.3. Seawater intake system fault tree diagram 
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Table 7.2. Fault event codes (RO plant) 
Code System Code Component Code Failure type 
I Seawater intake CV Check valve E Plugged 
R Reverse osmosis PI Plow meter P Leakage/rupture 
P Pretreatment PP Pipe G Test 6 Mainte­
E Electric power MI Mixer nance 
XV Manual valve W LOSS of func­




LI Instrumentation fault 
PM Pump Y Operator fault 
MO Motor A Short circuit 
BK Breaker P Reverse flow 
SV Solenoid valve fi Failed to open 
HS Hose U Unavailable 




OS Diesel engine 
HO Unit H 
JO Unit J 
Bg Unit B second-
stage 
Cg Unit C second-
stage 
Table 7.3. System and components unreliability and unavailability for 
seawater intake system 
Co»^nent a , ^ ^ 
or system 
Pump 3.2 2.7 1.6 
Pipe 2.5 4.2 2.5 
Motor operated valve 4.4 4 2.5 
Screen 2.7 2.2 1.4 
System 18 20 14 
*0 = the component failed probability. 
sum « the probability of one or more failures to 178 hours. 
« the component failure intensity. 
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7.8. Reverse Osmosis System 
7.8.1. Description 
The filtered water is pumped from the clearwell to nine separate first-
stage RO streams (Figure 7.7). The pressure in each of these streams is 
boosted by two vertical turbine pumps P-5A1, P-5A2, which must be balfmced 
so that each one gives a flow of 113.5 m^/hr (500 GPM) at 70 bar (100 psi). 
The operating pressure is controlled by regulating the speed of the 
diesel engines. Loss of flow is indicated by PSL-137A, and causes the 
vertical pumps and acid injection pump to shut down. The permeate flow 
for each unit is 30.5% recovery of water, and the flow and the conduc­
tivity are indicated on FE-212A and AE-213A, respectively. The brine, 
after the pressure has been reduced to atmospheric pressure through a 
flow control valve, is piped to the sea. The permeates are combined in­
to a common header which leads to the post-treatment system. When any 
unit is shut down, a low pressure alarm signal PAL-202 will cause the 
solenoid valve to open V8 to depressurize the unit. The feed flow and 
the feed pressure eure controlled by the diesel engines* speed, and the 
motor operated valve HV-216A(V7). Seven first-stage units are required 
%*en permeate is below 1000 mg/1. As the permeate increases above 1000 
mg/1, second-stage units are utilized. The pumps and diesel engines 
for the second-stage are identical to those for the first-stage, ex­
cept that only one pump (P-6A) is required per unit [44]. The permeate 
from the second-stage unit is combined with the permeate from the first-
stage units. P-6A will shut down at low suction pressure measured by 
PSL-161A, excessive discharge pressure being measured by PAH-271A. 

















Figure 7.7, Reverse osmosis system flow diagram 
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7.9. Reverse Osmosis System Performance 
Review of operational and maintenance data is summarized in Table 
7.4. Pipe leakage, pumps, diesel engines, and instrumentation failure 
are the main source of problems. The causes of these failures are 
due to several contributors, including improper selection of materials, 
inadequate operating conditions, inappropriate design, and bad mainte-
mance. Also, other factors which lead to plant outage are lack of main­
tenance and Insufficient spare parts, which require a long time to order. 
Burst hoses resulted in fracture of membranes where a number of the 
steel-reinforced rubber hoses between the feed or brine manifold amd the 
pressure tube had failed. Those hoses are being replaced with stain­
less steel tubing 148]. Most pump failures are due to bearing failure, 
mechanical seal, defective oil seal, or leaks. 
7.10. Fault Tree Analysis of Reverse Osmosis System 
Figure 7.7 is a simplified diagram showing the most important com­
ponents for first- and second-stage reverse osmosis units. The top 
event "first-stage operable unit failed to supply sufficient flow" is 
considered in the fault tree shown in Figure 7.8. The tree was con­
structed by tracing and identifying the most important events which 
would lead to the top event [23]. Table 7.4 presents the failure rates 
and repair times for each event. These data are extracted from actual 
operating plant reports [2-4]. 
7.11. Results 
Operating records of the RO units reveal that several factors had 
influenced the operation of the plant. Table 7.5 Illustrates the un-
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Table 7.4. Reverse osmosis syst«n failure rates 
Event No, Failure ratex 10 
of (per hr) 
fail­
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Figure 7.8, Fault tree diagram of first-stage reverse osmosis unit 
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Figure 7.8. {continued) 
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reliability and the unavailability of components which failed frequently 
and played a major role in the plant availability and life. From Table 
7.5, we conclude that the unavailability of each RO unit is 0.22, with 
the major contributors being pump failures and piping leakage. This 
high value of unavailability leads to some further Improvements which 
need to be considered. 
Table 7.5. Reverse osmosis system and components unreliability auid 
unavailability data 
Component Q F sum L 
Pump 1.2 X 10-2 9.4 X 10-2 5.9 X 10-^ 
Pipe 2.4 X 10-3 3.7 X 10:2 2.4 X 10-4 
Valve (MOV) 3.7 X 10-3 3.4 X 10-2 2.1 X 10-4 
Engine 1.2 X 10-2 9.4 X 10-2 5.4 X 10-4 
System 2.2 X 10-^ 9.8 X IQ-l 2.3 X 10-2 
7.12. Overall Plant Reliability 
The fault tree analysis of a reverse osmosis plant has been per­
formed in four different cases for the purpose of comparison, and to find 
the present plant performance. These four cases aure based on the value of 
the conductivity of permeate from the first-stage as shown in Table 7.6. 
The fault tree diagrams are shown in Figures 7.9-7.12, and the 
quamtitative results are given in Table 7.7. Figures 7.13-7.22 illustrate 
the estimates of unavaileibility for RO units, and the estimates of the 
probability of one or more failure to time t. 
The present plant operation is case 3, which Illustrates the present 
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Table 7.6 .  Required plant operating unit 
Case Salinity of the No. of first- No. of second-
• first-stage permeate stage operating stage operating 
mg/1 units units 
1 < 1000 7  -
2 < 2000 8 1 
3 < 3000 8 2 
4 > 3000 8 3 
Table 7.7 .  Reverse osmosis plant unreliability and unavailability data 
Case fi F sum L 
1 5 .5  X 10"2 5.6  X 10"1 4.9  X lO"  ^
2 8 .6  X lo"^ 7.8  X iO«"  ^ 9 .2  X 10~^ 
3 11 .4  X 10"2 8 .9  X lo"^ 1.4  X 10"2 
4  29 .3  X 10"2 9.9  X 10"1 3.8  X 10"2 
performance of the plant. 
It is felt that redundancy of equipment does improve the overall 
reliability. Furthermore, a high degree of redundancy and over 
capacity resulted in unnecessary complexity and an increase in 
the frequency of failures. 
7.13. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The above analysis has focused on reliability consideration for 
a reverse osmosis plant. Ite emphasis has been on the seawater intake 
system and the reverse osmosis unit. Hie results of this analysis in­
dicate that I 
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Figure 7,9. Fault tree diagram RO plant (case 1) 
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Figure 7,10. Fault tree diagram RO plant (case 2 )  
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Figure 7.11, Fault tree diagram RO plant (case 3) 
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Figure 7.22. Probability of failure to time t for RO plant (case 4) 
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1. The seawater intake system needs some improvements, including 
following a preventative maintenance program and selecting 
proper materials for pumps. 
2. Poor operating conditions are the source of troubles in 
the plant. 
3. The complexity of the systems contributed to plant outage. 
Two particular recommendations should be considered: 
1. Operators must keep adequate records, and 
2. Extreme care must be exercised in the design of the system 
to monitor and control the chemistry of the process streams. 
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8. IMPLICATION OP NUCLEAR DESALINATION PLANT 
In view of the rapidly Increasing water and power demands In Saudi 
Arabia and the need to use fossil fuel resources In some other Indus­
tries, It Is obvious that nuclear energy can and should make an Impor­
tant contribution toward meeting long-term energy requirements, itiere 
will be many advantages in using nuclear power. The most obvious benefit 
will be the reduced cost of water and electricity and the stabllzation 
of the supply. Also, nuclear power offers an additional degree of free­
dom in overall Industrial expansion, which could benefit a nation ats a 
whole. 
Nuclear plants do not require extensive fuel storage or transpor­
tation facilities. 
The dual-purpose or power-water plant appears to be paurtlcularly 
attractive where sizable quantities of water and power are needed. There 
eure sound technical and economic reasons for combining water and power 
production. In dual-purpose plants, major items of equipment, such as 
condensers, may be eliminated and other equipment and facilities can be 
shared. 
The selection, design, and construction of nuclear desalination 
plants involve the entire spectrum of technical, economical, reliability, 
and safety considerations. The reliability and safety aspects are dis­
cussed to assure the safety and the maximum performance from a plant 
designed to supply water and power. The total integration of all tech­
nical and safety variables is necessary in order that the required 
objectives of this type plant can be fully achieved. 
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8,1. Technical Aspects 
In the MSP process, brine is heated in a noncontact heat exchanger, 
and passes through a series of evaporators at a progressively reduced 
pressure. Heat input into the process is at the brine heater, where the 
saline water is heated to temperatures up to 121°C (250°P). The supply 
of heat at such temperatures is well within the capability of nuclear as 
well as fossil-fueled boilers. The distillation process temperature 
requirement is low compared with the temperature of steam normally 
delivered to the turbine in a power generation plant. Thus, the brine 
heater of the MSP distillation plant can be supplied with steam after 
partial expansion through a turbine. Nevertheless, the arrangements 
by which steam is supplied to the desalination plant have to be care­
fully considered. 
Nuclear reactors provide lower grade steam than that used by advanced 
conventional thermal power stations, but the steam is still much too high 
a grade to be used in a desalination plant. It should be mentioned that 
the steam pressure is unsuitable for seawater evaporators. If steam were 
used directly, it would condense at about 242^C (SOO^P) and cause severe 
and rapid scaling of the evaporator heat transfer surface. The steam 
would have to be depressurlzed by passing it through an expansion valve, 
and then desuperheated by means of water injection. The low pressure per­
mits the use of a less expensive technology, but also gives rise to heat 
transfer difficulties, which result in a considerable increase in the heat 
exchange surface areas, and in increases in the pumping power required 
for circulating the coolants. Thus, the distillation plant imposes upper 
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limits on steam temperature which can be tolerated without excessive 
scaling or corrosion. Additional constraints on the choice of bleed 
ten^erature can also be Imposed by the design arrangements for extracting 
steam from the turbine cycle. If a back pressure turbine is to be used, 
the lower pressure stages of the machine can be designed to provide the 
pass-out steam conditions required. However, if extracting the steam 
from a condensing turbine is proposed, there will be prearranged bleed 
points, which might not provide the exact steam conditions required. 
Furthermore, when electrical load changes are imposed on the condensing 
machine, the pressure amd temperature of the steam at the bleed point 
will change. 
Low temperature steam is to be used to desalinate water by heating 
processes. The steam generated at the po%fer plant and delivered to the 
desalinating plant is still not cost-free^because desalination needs 
steam at a pressure of about 35 - 172 kPa (5 - 25 psi)f whereas in a normal 
condensing power plant steam ceui be expanded to a pressure of about 
3.189 kPa (0.6 PSi). 
The process steam can be extracted from the casing of a condensing 
turbin#,or can be supplied as pass-out from a back pressure turbine. As 
indicated earlier, there are practical constraints associated with ex­
tracting the process steam from a condensing turbine, where in the case 
of a significantly larger desalination capacity, such extraction of 
larger quantity of steam results in a change in the pressure distribu­
tion throughout the machine. Significant changes to large machines of 
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standard design would be expensive and there is the danger of reliability 
reduction through the Introduction of modifications. 
Coupling of nuclear power to seawater reverse osmosis plants offers 
the advantage of potentially lower capital cost than existing thermal 
desalting techniques. Cost in^rovement may be obtained by combining a RO 
plant with a nuclear electrical generating facility. These cost improve­
ments can be realized through sharing of the intake structure to the RO 
unit. The largest consumers of power in RO plants are the pun^s that 
provide the pressure for the RO elements. They account for about 90 
per cent of the energy consumed. 
8.2. Safety of Nuclear Desalination Systems 
Boiling Water Reactors (BWR) have the disadvantage of steam contam­
ination with radioactive fission product and activation gases. In a 
process such as desalination, contamination of the brine circuit must, 
of course, be avoided. The facts that the brine heat exchanger is of 
the noncontact type and that the pressure on the brine side is normally 
higher than that on the steam side should provide reasonable assurance 
against such contamination. However, it is assumed that two barriers 
between reactor coolant and brine would be desirable. Therefore, a 
heat transfer "buffer" loop interposed between the BWR steam and the brine 
heater would be advisable [49]. Even in the case of a PWR, steam contamina­
tion can still result from leakage at the stew generator. However, the 
steam generator plus the brine heater do provide a double barrier that 
should be acceptable without an additional buffer. Nevertheless, there 
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Is great concern over using process heat that originates in a nuclear 
reactor in desalination plants, because of fear of potential contamina­
tion being carried over by the steam exhausted from the turbine to the 
desalination plant. 
In a pressurized water reactor (PNR) coupled with a desalination 
plant, three defects may appear in series* leakage in the fuel elements 
of the reactor, leakages in the steam generator tubes, and leakages in 
the desalination plant tubes. In this case, radioactive contamination 
may appear in the product water of the desalination plant because the 
pressure differences are in the undesirable direction from the potentially 
contaminated side to the product water side. The pressure in the primary 
circuit of the PWR is much higher than in the secondary side, and the 
pressure of the condensing steam inside the desalination tubes is slight­
ly higher than the pressure outside the tubes. 
The probability of such an event happening is very small. Moreover, 
the fluids potentially carrying the contamination «ure changing phase 
once or twice (in the steam generator and in the desalination plant). 
This reduces considerably the contamination level. But even if one 
assumes that the product water is being conteuninated, this does not yet 
endanger the public, because the activity of the water will be monitored 
in a number of places and if a contamination level is discovered, the 
desalination plant will be shutdown and the flow of water will be dis­
continued. 
Contamination of steam from the turbine in the brine heater with 
salted water due to leakage of brine is possible; hence, some factors 
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Should be considered before combining a nuclear steam supply system with 
a MSF plant. 
1. The brine heater should be engineered to standards of integrity 
at least as high as those of the turbine condenser, both to 
maintain an adequate barrier against contamination of the brine 
and to protect the steam and condensate against brine 
contaminati on. 
2. The condensate of the brine heater should be controlled and 
monitored. 
3. The condensate should be purified before it enters the steam 
generator. 
4. In case of contamination, the condensate should be dumped. 
Generally, nuclear power stations should not be sited close to 
populated areas. For a dual-purpose desalination plant, siting is a 
very important issue and for economic reasons, the plant must be located 
close to load centers. Thus, accidental radioactivity releases from 
dual-purpose desalination plants during normal operation must be sub­
stantially smaller than from current power plants. The design must be 
made so as to minimize the dependence on engineered safety systems by 
relying on inherently safe behavior of the reactor and its cooling 
system. In addition, minimizing the dependence on operator action and 
supervision following an accident must be considered. Therefore, the 
following safety features aure important : 
1. Shutdown and core cooling must be Msured in all accident con­
ditions as an inherent feature of design. 
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2. No requirement of operator action subsequent to accident 
(a walk away situation exists at all times). 
The rate of corrosion experienced in a MSP plant is likely to in­
crease in desalination plants working under adverse conditions such as 
improper materials in the construction or an inadequate program of main­
tenance. Corrosion in the desalination plant has a significant effect 
on the reliability, avedlability, life time, and safety of the plant. 
Corrosion products can arise anyvrtiere in the plant and build up activity 
due to neutron activation auid their presence will give rise to signifi­
cant radiation doses to plant personnel during maintenance. 
The safety impact of coupling an RO plant with a nuclear system is 
assumed to be negligible, since operation of the RO plant does not inter­
face with the nuclear plant operation as the RO plant uses only power 
from the nuclear systems. 
8.3. Operation Aspects 
Hie efficient operation of a flush-type evaporator is very sensitive 
to slight changes in operating conditions. Consequently, in startups, 
considerable time can be spent in balancing the evaporator for optimum 
operation. To minimize such operational problems, the nuclear plant 
should have high reliability, so as to provide a steady steam supply 
to the waterplant. To avoid saltwater entering the nuclear cycle or 
any radioactive contamination of the desalination plant, a steam/steam-
heat exchanger between the nuclear steam and the steam to the brine heater 
must be used. An auxiliary boiler is also required to provide the de­
salination plant with steam while the reactor is being relocated or in­
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spected. Reactor control is based not only upon electrical power demand, 
but also upon the requirements of the desalination plant. 
Since water storage presents no difficulties, there is a possi­
bility of using a dual-purpose nuclear desalination system in operation 
at a constant thermal power level and variable electric load. Such an 
operating mode is associated with daily and seasonal variations in demand 
for electric power and fresh water. A dual-purpose plant can ensure con­
stant nominal power of the reactor. 
The operation and surveillance of dual-purpose desalination plants 
would be from a remote control room so eis to reduce operator intervention 
vrtiere extensive training for operators would be performed. Adequate in­
structions for operation and supervision of safe shutdotm must be highly 
reliable. A desalination plant should not affect nuclear plant reliabil­
ity. 
Integrating of nuclear systems with either MSF plants or RO plants 
has many problems and many advantages. Table 8,1 gives a comparison 
of both MSF and RO plants coupled to nuclear power plants, Itiree major 
factors should be considered to increase the reliability of these 
plants. Hie first and primary factor is maintenamce of high heat 
transfer areas. The second factor is the selection of materials of 
construction that successfully and economically withstand the corrosive 
action of the distilled product water and of the brine. The third 
factor is designing the plant to utilize high standard equipment items, 
such as pumps and heat exchangers. 
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The availability is 0.65 0.51 
Salinity of product water (0-1 kg/m^) (0.50-1.5 kg/m^) 
High capital cost Low capital cost 
Operation Interface exists No operation Interface 
MSF plant consumes steam and power RO plant consumes power only 
Safety considerations of contamination. Safety considerations are for 
radiation release nuclear plant only 
Load regulation is flexible No load regulation exists 
Coupling of NSSS and MSF plants No direct coupling 
require extensive care 
Reliability of diesel engines 
will be improved 
Thermal pollution is high Thermal pollution is medium 
Manpower should be highly qualified Manpower should be qualified 
in both plants in nuclear plants 
Both systems should be in the RO should be located near the 
same siting city 
Additional cost for water No additional cost for water 
transportation to city transportation 
8.4. Combination of Nucleau: - MSF - RO Plants 
A dual-purpose system combining MSF and RO processes Is Illustrated 
schematically In Figure 8.1. In this aurrangement, the steam supplied 
by the NSSS passes first through the turbine,where some of Its energy 
Is converted to electric power. The steam from the turbine Is exhausted 
to the brine heater,where It Is condensed and returned as feedwater 



















Figure 8.1. Nuclear-MSF-RO desalting plants 
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to its maximum design value prior to beginning the MSP process. Then, 
the steam supplied by the NSSS passes to conventional turbine and 
condenser. This arrangement permits very large production capacity, 
high availability, and improved plant reliability, and provides savings 
on the cost of water power produced. 
8.5. Overall Availability of Nuclear Desalination Plants 
The integration of nuclear steam supply syst«n (NSSS) requires 
extensive care, in order to attain high availability of both plants and 
eliminate any prtAlems. The selection of coupling should not affect 
the availability of any plant, and careful selection of the coupling 
system requires specific considerations such as assessment of safety 
systems, maintenance program and high reliable equipment. 
The overall availability of nuclear desalination plants is estimated 
for three different schemes of coupling NSSS to desalination plants, and 
shows in Table 8.2, in trhich NSSS availability factor is estimated from 
operating units status reports of Light Water Reactors in the United 
States [50], and desalination plants availability is based on computations 
using actual operation experience data. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates different values of coupling the availability 
factor for three major schemes of nuclear desalination plants. The 
following conclusions are derived from Figure 8.2: 
1. Whatever the value of the coupling availability factor, the 
combination of a nuclear plant and a NSF plant and a RO 
plant would be the best available configuration. 
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2. The comparison between the combination of NSSS amd MSF plant 
and the combination of NSSS and RO plant will depend on the 
value of the coupling availability factor, if the coupling 
has an availability factor greater than 80%, then NSSS-MSF 
plant has a higher overall availability factor. In case the 
coupling has an availability factor less than 80%, then NSSS-
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Fig. 8.2. Nuclear deaallnatlon coupling availability 
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Table 8.2. Nuclear desalination plants availability factor 
Plant Availability Source 
Percent 
MSF 65 Chapter 6, Figure 6.12 
RO 51 Chapter "7, Figure 7.16 
NSSS 71 Reference [50] 
Coupling Ac Figure 8.2 
NSSSHMSF 46 Ac 
Derived values from 
NSSS-RO 36 Figure 8.3 
NSSS-MSF-RO (36+ 23 Ac) 




















Figure 8.3. Reliability block diagram for nuclear desalination plants 
« 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECCMMENDATICNS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
Certain operational aspects of the desalination plants were analyzed 
In the light of experience gained over several years of operation. In order 
to Investigate the reliability and safety of nuclear desalination plants. 
Review of the major processes of desalination which can be used In 
conjunction with nuclear power systems has shown that the MSF process Is 
a vleJale candidate for utilization of nuclear energy. Some possible 
arrangements of coupling the nuclear power plant with MSF desalination 
plants have shown that a back pressure condensing cycle is preferred In 
coupling with the nuclear systems. 
Based on the actual operating experience of MSF plant, Jeddah 
I, the seawater intake, makeup water, and brine recycle systems are the 
major contributors to operational problems and plant outage. 
The main factor that has emerged as a result of over nine years 
experience with MSF desalination plants is that the Inherent reliability 
of the heat transfer surfaces emd pumps needs to be improved. The steam 
generation system amd the electric power system are the dominant contrib­
utors to plant unavailability. 
Detailed fault tree analysis of these systems showed that the major 
contributors of unavailability to each system are pun^s, screens, flow 
control valves failures and tubes leakage. The results of the fault 
trees quantification indicated that the brine recycle system is the major 
source of plant outage due to severe operation conditions and inadequate 
maintenance programs. 
Recommendations for in^rovement of reliability, availability, and 
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safety indicated that extensive care should be taken in combining 
nuclear and desalination plants. Some of the recommendations entail 
placing emphasis on: 
1. Adequate selection of materials, 
2. Increase in the level of plant monitoring, and 
3. improvement in plant operation and maintenance procedures. 
The seawater intake system and the reverse osmosis membrane are the 
main contributors to the unavailability in RO plants, based on the actual 
operation experience. The fault tree analysis of these systems provided 
that high pressure pumps and diesel engines failures, pipes leakage, and 
membranes defects are the dominant contributors of the plant unavail­
ability. The bursting of a number of brine hoses hais caused considerable 
damage to some membrane elements and necessitated their replacement. The 
result of this emalysis showed that plant performance is decreasing with 
time. Furthermore, providing a high degree of redundancy and over ca­
pacity resulted in unnecessary complexity and an increase in the fre­
quency of failures. 
Discussion of several implication factors of integrating a Nuclear 
Steam Supply System (NSSS) with both MSF and RO desalination plants in­
dicated that the following factors have to be considered* 
1. Techniques of integrating the NSSS with desalination plants, 
2. Operational aspects of nuclear desalination plants, and 
3. Safety considerations. 
Consideration of water requirements, to cover the predicted water 
shortage, leads to the possibility and necessity of dual-purpose plants 
for the combined production of electricity and desalted water. 
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The Integration system of a NSSS with a MSP plant may include a 
back pressure turbine and safety system, while RO will use some power 
from the grid. A boiling water reactor is not recommended, due to 
safety cwisiderations. Contamination of steam in a MSP plant with 
radioactive products is found to have a very small probability, even 
though a safety system should be highly reliable. 
In the light of this study, the initial steps of introducing 
nuclear desalination plants in Saudi Arabia should be conducted by in­
stalling pilot plants to fit the functions of the dual-purpose power 
plant. The early installation of this plant will provide the necessary 
experience in nuclear r'-'wer technology to train engineers, scientists, 
and skilled technicians to meet the needs of the expanding long-range 
nuclear power program. 
9.1. Recommendations for Purser Studies 
Different aspects need to be studied in order to introduce nuclear 
technology to Saudi Arabia. Studies must be comprehensive and use actual 
data and different techniques. Further research and analysis are neces­
sary to provide a reliable assessment of nuclear desalination plants, 
and to investigate the potential of advanced technology in providing 
the needs of the people in the area. Some of the research projects which 
need specific consideration are* 
1. Reliability analysis of conceptual design of nuclear desali­
nation plants, 
2. Selection of optimum nuclear power and desalination plants, 
3. Safety aspects analysis of nuclear desalination plants. 
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The economic development of nuclear desalination plants in 
water and potrer supply systems. 
Technology needed for economic operation and maintenance of 
dual purpose nuclear desalination plants. 
Selection of desalination process for integration with 
nuclear system,and 
Assessment of the requirements for introducing nuclear energy 
in Saudi Arabia. 
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12. APPENDIX A. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE REPORT FOR 
MSF PLANT SAMPLE 
This report is a monthly report which includes operation and 
maintenance activities beside some statistical data on the performance 
of the plant. This report is for the period of January 1979. 
Operation aind Maintenance Report 
January 1979 
General 
Jeddah Power and Desalting Plant remained in satisfactory operation 
during the month of January 1979. Boiler NO. II and Turbine No. II 
were shut down on 6th January 1979 for annual overhauling and the 
unit was back in service after overhauling on 24th January 1979. 
Total Power Generated: 18,394,000 K.W.H. 
Total Water Produced* 103,792,800 U.S.G. 
Maximum Load: 44 M.W. at 1300 hours 
on 28th January 1979 
System Disturbances 
7.1.1979 
6 M.W. load dropped from system, some feeder tripped at SNEC 
end. 
24.1.1979 
10 M.W. load increased on our system, SNEC Gas Turbine tripped, 
29.1.1979 




At 0900 hours total plant shutdown occurred due to tripping of 
T/A-II auxiliary transformer on gen. diff. protection reify, 
T/Al was shut down for cleaning condensers and 091 coolers. Boiler 
II/T/A-II kept shut down for annual overhauling. 
8.1.1979 
At 1300 hours total plant shutdown occurred as unlimited load 
appeared on the system from SNEC side. The plant was back in 
service at 1520 hours. 
11.1.1979 
Evaporator No. 1 shut down due to high brine heater condensate con­
ductivity, evaporator back on production after pressure test of 
brine heater at 15.25 hours. 
16.1.1979 
Total plant shutdown occurred due to heavy rain. At 1320 Boiler 
I on line, at 1615 hours T/A-I on city load, at 20.15 hours 
Evaporator I in storage, and at 0945 hours on 17th January 1979 
Evaporator II production to storage. 
At 0445 hours on 17th January 1979, Evaporator I was shut down 
again due to high brine heater condensate conductivity, brine 
heater was pressure tested and evaporator was back on production 
at 0340 hours on 19th January 1979. 
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28.1.1979 
At 1000 hours Evaporator No, II was shut down due to high con­
densate conductivity. It came back on production at 1920 hours 
same day. 
General 
C.H. Pump 'A' was in service after overhauling. 
Evaporator No. ll brine recycle pump 2B underwent overhauling 
on 27th January 1979, 
Mechanical Section 
Routine Maintenance 
Routine maintenance checks were completed on following mad.n and 
auxiliaries equipments ; 
a. T/A-I & II and auxiliaries, 
b. Boiler No, I & II and auxiliaries. 
c. Evaporator No. I & II and auxiliaries, 
d. Emergency diesel generator and auxiliaries. 
e. C.W. pumps, travelling screens and screen wash pumps. 
f. Production pumps and chlorination system. 
Defect Maintenemce 
38 defect notifications were received this month, 23 defects were 
checked and completed, 15 defect notifications will be completed 
after Boiler No, 1 annual overhaul. 
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Major Defects 
C.vr. Pump *A* overhauling completed and pit back into service. 
Following spares were used: 
a. One section of pump shaft 
b. One thrust bearing. 
c. One set of packing ring. 
d. Packing sleeve. 
e. Qtie line shaft campling. 
f. Two railco bushing. 
9. one shaft sleeve. 
h. one case wearing ring. 
i. One impeller wearing ring 
Brine recycle pump '0' of Evaporator No. II under overhaul. 
Acid line from main storage tank isolating valve leaking, checked 
and repaired. 
Chemical pump 108A reported not pumping, necessary repair was 
completed. 
Shut Down Maintenance 
Boiler No. II and Steam Turbine No. II annual overhauling was 
carried out as per scheduled. In pressure test,it was found that 
two tubes %fere leaking from the bottom water tube's left side. 





Routine maintenance was done on turbo generators, gas turbine, 
Krupp units, diesel generator, petromin pumping station, fuel 
oil line, main and auxiliary transformers, station batteries, 
lighting and other auxiliaries. 
Defect Maintenance 
Product water pump 'C* breaker, breaker thermal trip defective| 
it was checked and found that the breaker was overheated, and 
it was replaced. 
Evaporator No. I acid pump *A' does not start, defect corrected; 
it was due to a failure of the starting switch. 
Boiler No. I control panel alarm not working; defect corrected 
and the faulty plug in relay was replaced. 
Chlorination plant old lighting fixtures were corroded away and 
they were replaced by a local lighting fixture. 
Shut Down Maintenance 
T/A-II was down during this month for the major overhaul; all the 
maintenance jobs were completed according to the schedule and unit 
was back on load. During this shut down, the replacement of the 
current transformer cables between the differential relay and 
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current transformer of oil circuit breaker and the final connection 
was done as per recommendation of Chas T Main in order to balance 
resistance of the circuit. 
Instrument Section 
Routine Maintenance 
Routine maintenance checks were completed on the following main 
and auxiliaries equipmentt 
1. Control room inking system, charts replacement, cleaning, 
checking minor defects and time adjustments. 
2. Ph cells of recorders rec. point on evaporators checking and 
servicing. 
3. COg boilers sample point sensing line. 
4. Routine maintenance cards. 
5. Diesel tanks level indicators for gas turbine, checked for 
proper operation. 
Defect Maintenance 
Twenty-six (26) defect notifications were received from operation 
department and 24 defects were completed; two were shut down jobs. 
Malor Defects 
1. Boiler No. II gas air heater soot blower valve not operating 
properly, checked and repaired. 















Boiler NO. I soot blower drain valve not working, checked and 
repaired. 
Evaporator No. I make-up control valve not working, serviced 
and calibrated. 
Product water tank L.C.V. remains open 50%, control valve 
serviced and calibrated. 
Boiler NO. I soot blower press, gauge after PCV leakage, 
checked and repaired. 
Soot blower boiler No. I steam line press, gauge hole in the 
line, checked and repaired. 
Fuel oil return control valve hunting and not functioning 
properly, adjusted the controller setting, checked valve and 
changed the pressure regulator. 
Service air ccnp. *B' fails to unload, removed solenoid for 
repairing and calibration. 
Evaporator No. I conductivity recorder cord broken, change 
new card and recorder checked. 
Distillate flow meter to be repaired, checked and repaired. 
Boiler No. I drum level is upset, level transmitter checked 
and corrected. 
Boiler No. I heavy fuel oil integrator and control rocn signal 
out of order, removed for servicing and repaired. Signal was 
also checked. 
Boiler NO. I heavy fuel oil receiving station leakage in flow 
indicator, need check up and repair, checked and repaired/ 
calibrated. 
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15. Ignition oil pressure transmitter boiler No. I out of order, 
removed for repairing and checked. 
16. Boiler No. II feedwater control valve hunting, air filter 
changed. 
17. Boiler No. II both yarways are not showing correct reading, 
both checked and O.K. now. 
18. Evaporator No. I L.P. steam control valve effective controller 
repaired. 
19. Boiler No. II gas air heater inlet and outlet temperature not 
working, both checked and repaired. 
20. Service air compressor 'B' does not cut off, checked and 
repaired. 
21. Boiler No. I burner II fuel oil control trif^d itself, shut 
off solenoid valve was defective, changed and system checked. 
22. Boiler No. I fuel oil control valve needs repair, checked 
and repaired. 
Shutdown Maintenance 
During this month T/A-II and Boiler No. II were shut down for 
annual overhauling; all the maintenance jobs were conqpleted accord­
ing to the schedule and unit was back on load. 
Monthly Figures 
Units of Electricity Generated; 18,394,000 K.W.H. 
Units of Electricity Consumed: 2,816,100 K.W.H. 
Units of Electricity Sent to City, 15,577,900 K.W.H. 
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Water Producedi 
Mater Sent to City* 
Fuel Oil Consumption 
Boiler No. I 






Evaporator No. I 
Evaporator No. II 
Figures Since Start Up 
Units of Electricity Generated: 
Units of Electricity Consumedi 
Units of Electricity Sent to City: 
Water Produced: 










732 1/4 HOURS 
263 HOURS 








60,454 3/4 HOURS 
58,909 HOURS 
30,688 1/2 HOURS 
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Evaporator No. I 60,654 HOURS 
Evaporator No. II 59,934 HOURS 
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13. APPENDIX B. MAINTENANCE AND DEFECTS REPORTS OF 
RO PLANT SAMPLE 
The following information is given from weekly reports on mainte­
nance activities achieved from February 24 to March 9, 1979 and from 
March 15-21, 1980. Defects log books give some brief information on 
malfunctions and repairs performed. 
Maintenance Work (2/24-3/9. 1979} 
1. The plant shutdown on February 26 and 27, 1979 due to modification 
of the acid system and the jockey pump section piping. Both 
modifications were successfully completed and the plant was put 
back on stream. 
Routing engine and gear box maintenance was carried out with oil 
and filter changes. 
2. R. O. modules I had full inspection of membranes on the top vessel 
and all are in order. "O" ring leaks on module J and H have been 
rectified and conductivity on both these units is good. 
All additional supports on jockey pump completed. 
Work started on vibration analysis of engines and gear boxes to 
determine \Ay gear boxes vibrate. This work should be completed 
^ March 8, 1979. 
3. From March 6 and 7, 1979 the plant wais shutdown due to oil spillage 
in Jeddah I discharge line. 
Considerable cleaning had to take place. 
4. We had oil contamination in the sea intake and up to the splitter 
box. 
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Routine 125 hours maintenance was carried out on engines of modules 
A, B, and C. 
5. Several brine hoses failed and were replaced. 
6. One end cap failed and tras replaced. 
7. 200 hours services were carried out on the following unitst 
Al, Bl, CI, D, E, and H. 
8. Began work on checking out the pretreatment skid. All electrics 
checked out and all pumps checked and started for operation. 
Cleaning and patch painting of the units is still in progress. 
9. Changed faulty V4 valve and fitted new solenoid on filter B, cell 
3. 
10. Fitted new mechanical seal to acid supply pump P-12, checked out 
pump motor and took full load current readings. 
11. Changed cartridge filters on unit Al. 
12. Carried out electrical and end cap repair work in an effort to 
further reduce conductivities. 
13. The plant was shutdown intermittently due to lack of maintenance 
on the sea intake. 
Date Defects 
14-2-81 Fit new Amarillo oil coolers. Repaired. 
15-2-81 J20. Fan bearings worn. Engine speeds. Reduced. 
16-2-81 P-lC pump couldn't prime. Repacked. 
16-2-81 DlO. Amarillo bearings and gears need inspection. Re­
moved to workshop. 
16-2-81 H unit. N°19 RFM decreases. Governor requires attention. 
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Repaired. 
16-2-81 Various units fuel pressure gauges U/S. 
17-2-81 Traces of oil in No. 13 radiator. Engine or cooler U/S. 
17-2-81 OGl fan bearing noisy needs grease. DGl tacho U/S. 
18-2-81 Oil present in E-13 engine radiator that may be due to 
engine oil cooler leakage. 
18-2-81 F14 D.C. system not functioning. 
18-2-81 F15 water pump leaking, 
19-2-81 E unit two and cap to renew, studs to remove and replace. 
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14. APPENDIX C. THE PREP RUN FOR CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 
The RŒP programs find the minimal cut sets and/or the minimal 
path sets from the system's fault tree, and output them in format 
compatible for use with KITT, 
The PREP minimal cut sets may be obtained by either deterministic 
testing or Monte Carlo simulation. The system's minimal path sets are 
found by Monte Carlo simulation. The code is composed of two sections: 
IREBII trhich reads the input and generates the logical equivalent of 
the fault tree and MINSET which obtains the minimal cut or path sets of 
the fault tree. 
The TREBIL program is designed to accept a description of the 
system fault tree in a format which is natural for the engineer, and to 
generate a logical equivalent of that fault tree. 
The MINSET program determines the minimal cut or path sets of the 
fault tree. The MINSET program allows minimal cut sets to be found 
by either detezministic testing or by Monte Carlo simulation. Minimal 
path sets must be found by Monte Carlo simulation. 
Deterministic testing is the most reliable method for obtaining 
minimal cut sets since it is theoretically possible to test all pos­
sible combination of components. 
The probability of a failure before time t for a component is 
computed by the exponential distribution. If this probability of a 
failure before time T is p(t), then 
p(T) « 1 - exp(-\T) 
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where 
X. Is the failure intensity (per hour) for the particular 
component and T is the time in hours. 
The fault tree shown in Figure 6.3 represents the input to the 
PREP codes. Each unique primary event on the fault tree is assigned 
an arbitrary unique name. Each gate is then coded on the input card. 
This card gives the name of the gates euid/or primary event attached 
to the gate. Besides the fault tree, the input data necessary to use 
the PREP codes are the component failure rate and repair times. These 
values are listed in Table 4.20. The fault tree is analyzed using the 
PREP codes, and the results are shown in the following pages. 
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**$$**#**#$**$##*#***$**#***#**$*********$*********#$****#*#*******$*$ 
*TREBIL FAULT TREE BUILOING PROGRAM 
$$****$##******#»******************$*$***#*******#****$*******»*#***** 
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF DESALINATION PLANTS 
NUMBER OF CATEStNC— 43 
COMBO STARTING VALUE,WIN 1 
COMBO ENDING *ALUE,MAX— 2 
CUT SET - PATH SET SWITCH,lOEXI I  
PRINT - 3JSCM SWITCH, IDEX2---- — — t 
yONTE CARL3 STARTER,MCS—I 
NO. OF RAN30M NUMBERS TO REJECT,NREJEC 10 
NO. OF MONTE CARLO TRIALS,NTR 1000 
MIXING PARAMETER SWITCH.IREN 1 
MONTE CARLO MIXING PARAMETER, TAA .0 
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23 3ArF31 OR 
29 GATE 30 AND 
30 GATE29 OR 
31 3ATF26 • R 
32 SAT=2S OR 
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3fl 3ATP12 OR 
39 3ATE8 OR 
%0 SATE6 OR 
41 SATES AND 
$2 T3P OR 
43 3ATE21 AND 
CATE32 GATF33 A^M03AV 
SATk31 GATE36 
SATF30 APPAHCF APPOABF 





GATEl 9 APM004H 
3ATEIS GATE16 GATEI7 
GATEl 3 APM004W 
3ATE9 GATFIO GATEl1 
GATES GATE14 
SATE5 GATE 7 





TREBIL FAULT TREE BUI LOINS PROGRAM* 
»• • • • •»  •# ! • • • • • • • • • • • • • •» • • • • • • • • • • • •  • • • • • • • • •  * * *$ * * * * * * * * * *$ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ,  
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF DESALINATION PLANTS 
I ARK02CA 1 GATE45 
2 APS02CW 1 GATE4S 
3 AEK02BA 1 6ATE43 
4  APS02BM 1 CATE43 
5 ABK02AA 1 GATE41 
6 APS02AM 1 GATE41 
7 ACV3B1» 1 GATE3R 
8 AXV3D2P 1 GATE38 
9 APP03B» 1 GATE3a 
10 AM003BW 1 GATE 39 
11 ABK03BA 1 G ATE 39 
12 AMn03AW 1 GATE34 
13 ABK03AA 1 GATE 34 
14 AXV3A23 1 GATE 32 
15 ACV3A1I» 1 GATE 32 
16 APP03A* 1 GATE32 
17 AMV004« 3 GATE290 GATE28 
IS AMV004X 3 GATE290 GATE28 
19 APP002F 3 GATE290 GATE28 
20 AXV005P 3 GATE 290 GATE2A 
21 AM3004W 2 GATE19 GATE13 
22 ABK004A 2 GATE 19 GATE13 
23 AMVOOl Y 2 6ATE17 GATEll 
24 APq004Y 2 GATE 17 GATEl 1 
25 AMVOOIX 2 GATE 16 GATFIO 
26 APM004X 2 GATE16 GATEIO 
27 AMVOOl# 2 GATE 15 GATE9 
2A APP004F 2 GATEIS GATE9 
29 ApySTBG 1 GATE/ 
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OGICAL TOP«A( 500),X( 500) 
OMMON/TREES/A,X,TOP 
1) = X( D.OR.Xf 2) 
2) = X( 3).0R.X| 4) 
3) = X( 5).0R.X( 6) 
4) = X( 7).0R.X< 8).OR.X( 9) 
5) = X( 10).QR.X( 11) 
6) = X{ 12).0R.X( 13) 
7) = X( 14).0R.X( 15).nR«X( 16) 
8) = X( 17).0R.X( 13).GR«XC 19)«0R«X( 20) 
9) = X( 17).0*.X( 18).nR.X( 19).OR.X( 20) 
10) = X( 17).OR.X( 18).OR.X( 19).OR.X< 20) 
11) = X( 21).0R.X( 22) 
12) = X( 23).OR.X( 24) 
13) = X( 25).0R.X( 26) 
14) = X( 27).0R.X( 28) 
15) = X( 21).0R.X( 22) 
16) s X( 23).Oa.X( 24) 
17) = X( ?5).0R.X( 26) 
18) = XI 27).0R.X( 28) 
19) = X( 29).OR.X( 30).0R.X( 31) 
20) = X( 32).OR.X( 33) 
21) = A( 1) 
• OR.Xf 34).0R.X( 35) 
22) = A( 2) 
•OR.XC 36).0R.X< 37) 
23) = A( 3) 
•OR.Xt 38).0R.X( 39) 
24) = A( 5) 
.03.X( 40) 
25) - A( 24).0R.A( 4) 




0029 AC 25) Al 23).OR.Al 22).0R • Al 21 ) 
0030 A( 27) s Al 6) 
* • OR.XI 44) 
00 31 A( 28) Al 7).OR.Al 27) 
* # OR.XI 45).HR. XI 46) .OR. XI 47) 
00 32 AI 29) Al 28).AND.Al 25) 
0033 Al 30) Al 29) 
$ . OR.XI 48).OR. XI 49) 
00 34 Al 31) Al 10).OR.Al 9) 
0035 Al 32) S Al 31).OR.Al 30) 
00 36 Al 33) s Al 32) 
« • AND.XI 50) 
0037 Al 34) Al 33).OR.Al 26) 
0038 Al 35) Al 34) 
* • OR.XI 51) 
0039 Al 36) Al 11) 
» • OR.XI 52) 
0040 Al 37) Al 14).OR.Al 13).OR .Al 12)«OR • A( 
0041 Al 38) s Al 15) 
* • OR.XI 52) 
0042 Al 39) Al 18).OR.Al 17).OR • A ( 16).OR .Al 
0043 Al 40) s Al 39).OR.Al 37) 
0044 Al 41 ) Al 40).AND.Al 19) 
0045 Al 42) s Al 41).OR.Al 20).OR .Al 35) 





K >  ilk 
TOP s A( 
RETURN 
ENO 
4 3 )  
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« T R E R I L  F A U L T  T R E E  B J I L D I N G  P R O G R A M  
R E L I A B I L I T Y  A N A L Y S I S  O F  D E S A L I N A T I O N  P L A N T S  
T H I S  I S  T H E  S U B R O U T I N E  G E N E R A T E D  O Y  T R E B I L  
S U B R O U T I N E  T R E E  
L O G I C A L  T O P , A (  5 0 0 ) , X (  5 0 0 )  
C O M M O N / T R E E S /  A ,  X ,  T O P  
A C  1 )  «  X t  1 )  . O R . X f  2 )  
A (  2 )  «  X t  3 ) . 0 R ^ X f  4 )  
A f  3 )  »  X t  5 ) . O R ^ X t  6 )  
A (  • ) «  X t  7 )  . o a . x t  8 ) . O R . X f  9 )  
A <  5 )  »  x t  1 0 ) . O R . X t  1 1 )  
A (  6 )  «  x t  1 2 )  . O R . X t  1 3 )  
A (  7 )  «  x t  1 4 ) . O R . X t  1 5 )  . O R . X f  1 6 )  
A (  8 )  «  x t  1 7 ) . O R . X t  1 8 ) . O R . X f  1 9 ) . O R .  X f  
A (  9 )  «  x t  1 7 ) . O R . X t  1 8 ) . O R . X f  1 9 ) . O R .  X t  
A (  1  0 )  »  x t  1 7 ) . O R . X t  1 8 )  . O R . X t  1 9 ) . O R .  X t  
A (  1  1 )  «  x t  2 1 ) . O R . X t  2 2 )  
A (  t  2 )  »  x t  2 3 ) . O R . X t  2 4 )  
A (  1  3 )  »  x t  2 5 )  . O R .  X f  2 6 )  
A (  1 4 )  *  x t  2 7 ) . O R . X t  2 8 )  
A (  1 5 )  «  X f  2 1 ) .  O R .  X  t  2 2 )  
A (  1 6 )  «  X f  2 3 ) . O R . X f  2 4 )  
A( 1  7 )  »  X f  2 5 ) . O R . X f  2 6 )  
A f  1  8 )  «  X f  2 7 ) . O R . X t  2 8 )  
A( 1 9 )  •  X f  2 9 ) . O R . X t  3 0 ) . D R . X t  3 1 )  
A f  2 0 )  »  X f  3 2 ) . O R . X t  3 3 )  
A f  2  1  )  •  A t  
. O R .  
1  )  
X t  3 4 ) . O R .  X f  3 5  )  
A f  2 2 )  »  A t  
•  O R .  
2 )  
X t  3 6 ) . O R .  X f  3 7 )  
A f  2 3 )  »  A t  
.  O R .  
3 )  
X f  3 8 ) . 0 3 .  X f  3 9  )  
A t  2  4 )  *  A t  
. O R .  
5 )  
X t  4 0 )  
A f  2 5 )  «  A t  2 4 ) . O R . A t  4 )  
.  O R  .  X t  4 1 ) . 0 3 .  X f  4 2 ) . O R .  X f  4 3 )  
A t  2 6 )  «  A t  2 3 ) . O R . A t  2 2 ) . O R . A t  2 1  )  
A t  2 7 )  s  A t  
. O R .  
6 )  
X f  4 4 )  
A t  2 8 )  »  A t  7 )  . O R .  A t  2 7 )  
•  O R .  X t  4 5 ) . 0 3 .  X t  4 6 ) . O R .  X t  4 7 )  
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4 (  2 9 )  A (  2 8 ) . A N O . A (  2 5 )  
A (  3 0 )  A (  2 9 )  
•  O R .  X (  4 8 ) . O R ^  X (  4 9 )  
A (  3  1 )  A (  1  0 )  . O R . A (  9 )  
A (  3 2 )  A (  3 1 > « O R . A (  3 0 )  
A (  3 3 )  A (  3 2 )  
• AND • X <  5 0 )  
A C  3 4 )  A (  3 3 ) . 0 R . A (  2 6 )  
A (  3 5 )  A (  3 4 )  
•  O R  •  X (  5 1 )  
A (  3 6 )  A (  1 1 )  
•  O R ^  X< 52) 
A (  3 7 )  A (  1 4 ) . O R . A (  1 3 ) . O R . A (  1 2 ) ^ 0 R .  A (  
A (  3 8 )  A (  1 5 )  
•  O R *  X (  5 2 )  
A <  3 9 )  A (  1 8 ) « O R ^ A f  1 7 ) . 0 R . A (  1 6 ) . 0 R ^  A (  
A (  4 0 )  A (  3 9 ) • O R ^ A (  3 7 )  
A (  4 1  )  A (  4 0 ) • A N D . A I  1 9 )  
A <  4 2 )  A (  4 1 ) . 0 3 . A (  2 0 )  . O R . A C  3 5 )  
A (  » 3 )  A (  3 9 )  •  A N O . A f  3 7 )  
T33 « m 43) 
R E T U R N  
FN) 
THFRE *E1E 52 COMPONENTS INDEXED IN THIS TREE 
MINIMAL CUT SET*! FOUND BY COMBO FOR 
*$***********$********************* 
MINIMAL CUT SFT NO. I 
AMOOO*W 
CORRESOQMDING GATE FAILURES-
11 15 36 37 
MINIMAL CUT SET NO. 2 
ABKOO» A 
CORRES^OMOING GATE FAILURES-
11 15 36 37 
MINIMAL CUT SET NO. 3 
AMVOOlY 
CORRES30M3ING GATE FAILURES-
12 15 37 39 
MINIMAL CUT SET NO. 4 
APM004Y 
CORRFSf>ON01 NG GATE FAILURES-
12 16 37 39 
MINIMAL CUT SET NO. 5 
AMVOOlX 
CORRESPOND:NG GATE FAILURES-
1 3* 17 37 39 
REL:ABILITY ANALYSIS OF DESALINATION 
PLANTS 
*$**$***$# 
38 39 40 43 





40 4 3 
M I N I M A L  C J T  S E T  N O .  6  
A P M O O t X  
C O R R E S P O S 3 I N G  G A T E  F A I L U R E S -
1 3  1 7  3 7  3 9  4 0  4 3  
M I N I M A L  C U T  S ï T  N O .  7  
A M V O O l M  
C O R R E S P O N D ! N G  G A T E  F A I L U R E S -
1 4  l a  3 7  3 9  4 0  4 3  
M I N I M A L  C U T  S E T  N O .  8  
A P P 0 0 4 F  
C O R R E S P O N D I N G  S A T E  F A  I L U R E S -
1 4  1 9  3 7  3 9  4 0  4 3  
M I N I M A L  C U T  S E T  N O .  9  
A P M 0 0 4 W  
C O R R E S P O N D I N G  G A T E  F A I L U R E S -
3 6  3 7  3 8  3 9  4 0  4 3  
END OF OUTPUT FROM MI MS ET ********** 
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15. APPENDIX D. KITT-ONE RUN FOR SEAWATER INTAKE SYSTEM 
The KITT codes consist of two sections* KITT-one and KITT-two, 
KITT-one can handle components which are nonrepairable or %*ich have a 
constant repair time t. The failure intensity (X) of each component 
is assumed to be constant with respect to time (i.e., exponential fail­
ure distributions are only considered). 
Besides the \ and t for each component, KITT-one requires as input 
either the unique minimal cut sets of the fault tree or the unique 
minimal path sets of the fault tree. 
For each component of the fault tree, KITT-one obtains the follow­
ing reliability characteristics; 
q(t)i the probability that the component is in its failed state 
at time t. 
w(t)t the expected number of failures the component will suffer 
per unit time at time t. 
/^w(t)dti the expected number of failures the component will 
suffer during the time interval from 0 to t . 
l-exp(-X,t)t the probability that the component will suffer one 
or more failures during the time intervals from 0 
to t. 
The input data for KITT-one code aure given next. 
Having obtained the minimal cut sets from the PREP codes, KITT-one 
code is then run to obtain the probability characteristics associated 
with the circulating seawater system fault tree. The results from the 
KITT-one code include the system differential and integral character-
247 
Istlcs. The output of the program is shown in the next section where 
the program output symbols are defined as followsi 
T(hours) = time 
Q « the component failed probability 
W » the component failure rate (per hour) 
L = the component failure intensity (per hour) 
W Sum = the expected number of failures 
F Sum = the probability of one or more failures to time t. 
: 
i  
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4t ••tooootooo-os Saoooo^ooeo 00 
43 S.33J0OSOOO-O3 $.000000000 ot 
4» #.*e#oe#soo-s4 *.00000000) 31 
4S 4.se#ose#o^@3 s.000000000 90 
44 ••t0«000s00>09 s.oooooooai 00 
47 3.33W0e#ea-o3 t.OOOOOOOOO 01 
4# 3.tSMMOOO-OS 1.000000003 01 
44 3.#S##Se0SfM0S 1.000000003 01 
M t.O0MM0«O»O3 9.000030000 01 
tl «•MMStOO^QS 4.000000000 01 
•t t. «eooMOOo-e4 #.000000000 01 
nRACKir «LAC (isro»u #v$ve# inp9«>«ation is ootaipco fnom «fiACKKTiNo. ip isro^i ir is not. 
mm THIS ##q#Le# isto# • i 
wo. OP TIME POINTS INTPTI •  21 
PHINT OUT i#ULT|PL* (NOJTI •  I 
M8SM Size fOf.TAl # I.fOOOOOOO) 01 lOUPS 
SET #LAG <IP*rM|« %# IP ATM#» «I ' t lWAc CJT S«TS &#€ JSCO* IP tPATM«t MIN|P%L PATH SETS AKC USED. 
POR this POOPLEN IPATM » 1 
MO. OF SETS IMCJT 1 • 4 
SET |P^0«M4T|0N 
SET NO. 1 • #|TH CP4PONENTS 
SET MO. t • WITH 9
 1 
SET NO. 3. «1 TH CCMPOMEMTS 
SET MO. # • «ITH COHPOKEMrs 
SET MO. 9. "IT4 CfMPO NEWTS 
SET NO. 4$ • ITM CCNPOMENTS 
SET NO. r. WITH COMPONENTS 
SET MO. o« • ITH cohpoments 
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